NOTES by unknown
JUDICIAL STATISTICS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION*
WITH THE constitutionality of minimum wage laws for women established,
a chapter in American constitutional "law" has closed.1 The record of that
chapter has brought abundant vindication to those who urge that the judge
often translates "his tiny stock of scattered and uncoordinated philuophies
. . .with all his weaknesses and unconscious prejudices," into "objective
truth."2
But since "philosophies" and "prejudices" stem not from written but from
mental constitutions, many are the theories seeking to discover the true touch-
stone of the judicial process. Some flatly assert that the judge's function is
to interpret the Constitution "as written." For these, the judicial process is
mechanical and simple: Document is to be placed beside statute; if the latter
matches the former, the constitutional mandate is met. Another school -
more sophisticated -asserts that the judge finds in the due process clause
his own brand of "higher law;" by a strange process of osmosis the Con-
stitution absorbs the Natural Law, and the crucial but empty phrase, "due
process of law," becomes meaningful. To the students of gastronomic juris-
prudence, breakfast foods assume a controlling role: what the judge eats
wil determine what the Constitution says.
Such irreconcilable rationales leave the student slightly confused. He seeks
solace in statistics. How do the biographical facts of the judges who cast
their votes in favor of minimum wage legislation compare with those of the
judges opposed? Are the inner springs of judicial preference to be found in
the facts of life? 3
* Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (March 29, 1937).
1. Ibid. (Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, JJ., dissented),
[(1937) 5 I. J. A. Buu.. 119] aff'q 185 Wash. 581, 55 P. (2d) 1033 (1935).
2. CAR~ozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL ProcEss (1921) 172.
3. The table below is based upon the following decisions: Stettler v. O'Hara, 69
Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743 (1914) and Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Ore. 261, 141 Pac. 158 (1914)
(7 judges: constitutional), aff'd, 243 U. S. 629 (1917) (4 justices: constitutional-4:
unconstitutional; Brandeis, J., not voting) ; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W.
495 (1917) and Miller Tel. Co. v. Minimum Wage Comm., 145 Minn. 262, 177 N. W.
341 (1920) (6 judges: constitutional); State v. Crowe, 130 Ark. 273, 197 S. W. 4
(1917) (3 judges: constitutional- 2 : unconstitutional); Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash.
642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918) and Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac.
595 (1920) (11 judges: constitutional); People v. Alvarez, 28 P. R. R. 332 (Porto
Rico 1920) (5 judges: constitutional); Children's Hospital v. Adkins, 234 Fed. 613
(App. D. C. 1922) (2 judges: constitutional-2. unconstitutional), aft'd, 261 T. S. 525
(1923) (5 judges: unconstitutional-3: constitutional; Brandeis, J., not voting); To-
peka Laundry Co. Y. Court of Industrial Relations, IlN Kan. 12, 237 Pac. 1041 (1925)
(4 judges: unconstitutional-3: constitutional); People ex rel. Tipaldo v. 1forehead,
270 N. Y. 233. 200 N. E. 799 (1936) (4 judges: unconstitutional-3: constitutional),
[Feotnotes continued on page ixg]
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Large city .......... 13
Medium-sized city ... 12
Small town ......... 8
Law teachers (part




State, co., or city atty. 17
State Legislature .... 6
School Board ....... 3
Governor ........... I
Asst. Atty. Gen ....... 3
U. S. Dist. Atty. ....... 3




AGE AT TIME OF DECISION
(BY VoTES)*
40-49 years .......... 7
50-59 years .......... 23
60-69 years .......... 23
70-79 years .......... 7
80--- . ........... 2
Unknown ........... I
AVERAGE AGE ........... 60
AVERAGE No. OF YEARS
ON SUPREME BENCH.. 81
AVERAGE NO. OF YEARS
ON ALL BENCHES .. 15
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*Except where otherwise indicated, the table is arranged by judges rather than by votes.
t The material summarized in the table was compiled from WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA,
Vols. VII-XIX (1912-1937); DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY (1928-1936);
































POWER OF RECEIVER FOR CORPORATION TO ASSERT CAUSES OF ACTION
VESTED SOLELY IX CREDITORS *
A RECEIVER for an insolvent corporate broker, in the process of liquida-
tion,' sued on a surety bond taken out by the broker for the benefit of holders
of interim certificates,2 who comprised a large proportion of the total num-
ber of creditors. Since the broker had no right of action upon the bond,3
the court, after dismissing the complaint for want of proper allegation, ex-
pressed an opinion that as a matter of substantive law the action would not
lie because, first, tie claim asserted did not arise out of a transaction in
fraud of creditors, and, secondly, a receiver cannot sue on behalf of a lim-
ited number or class of creditors.
4
The power of a receiver for a corporation to sue is limited to causes of
action which the corporation could have asserted but for his appointment,
and any claim on his part is subject to defenses available against the cor-
aff'd, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (5 judges: unconstitutional-4: constitutional); Parrish v.
West Coast Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 55 P. (2d) 1033 (1936) (5 judges: constitu-
tional), aff'd, 57 Sup. Ct. 57S (5 justices: constitutional-4: unconstitutional) ; Walker
v. Chapman, No. 1170 (S. D. Ohio, Nov. 20, 1936) (2 judges: constitutional--I: un-
constitutional), (1937) 5 GEo. WAsH. L Rm. 261.
With the exception of the last cited case, and the Adkins case in the lower court, only
decisions of supreme courts are included.
The following cases are not included because they were decided solely on the author-
ity" of the Adkins case without expression of opinion: People v. Successors of Laur-
naga. 32 P. R. R. 766 (Porto Rico 1924) ; Folding Furniture Works v. Industrial Comm.,
300 Fed. 991 (W. D. Wis. 1924) ; Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U. S. 530 (1925); Donham v.
West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U. S. 657 (1927).
Van Devanter and 'McReynolds, JJ., voted upon the question four times. Sutherland
and Butler, JJ., cast three votes. Hughes, C. J., and McKenna, Holmes, Brandeis,
Stone, Roberts and Cardozo, JJ., voted twice, as did two judges of the Washington
Supreme Court. One of the judges cast a vote on both sides of the question and is
counted throughout as two judges.
In allocating the justices in Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917), in which the
Oregon decision was affirmed by an equally divided court, the following division has
been made (after Powell) : White, C. J., and MeKenna, Van Devanter, and McRey-
nolds, JJ., for reversal; Holmes, Day, Pitney, and Clarke, JJ., for affirmance. See
Powell, The Judiciality of .MIimna WVage Laws (1924) 37 HArv. L R,'. 545, 549-550.
* Kennedy v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 153 Ore. 646, 58 P. (2d) 625 (1935).
1. The opinion does not indicate whether the receiver was an equity or a statutory
receiver. Probably he was appointed under Section 32-702, OME Co A:::. (1930),
providing for receivers for insolvent corporations.
2. The state blue sky law required this. Omn CoDo ANN~. (1930) § 25-1319.
3. If the bond had been one affording a right of action to the insolvent, there
would have been no question of the receiver's power to sue upon it as an asset of the
insolvent. American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Moran, 75 F. (2d) 646 (App. D. C. 1935),
cert. denied, 294 U. S. 720 (1935).
4. Kennedy v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 153 Ore. 646, 58 P. (2d) 625
(1936).
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poration.5 But an exception to the general rule has been developed to allow
a receiver to attack transactions in fraud of creditors.0 The usual rationaliza-
tion of this exception has been that he may sue in the right of creditors only
to recover something which was once an asset of the corporation, though
presently beyond its reach by reason of its participation in the fraudulent
transaction.7 While this concept has been stretched to include suits on un-
5. James v. Bosworth, 223 Ky. 1. 2 S. W. (2d) 1075 (1927); Hering v. Tait,
65 F. (2d) 703 (C. C.A. 4th, 1933); HIGH, RECEIVERS (4th ed. 1905) § 315; 2 TARDY'S
SMITH ON RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1920) § 744. A further limitation on the power of an
ordinary chancery receiver is his incapacity to sue outside the jurisdiction of his
appointment. Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561 (1905); 1 CLARK,
RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 591. But cf. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 122 (1934);
16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1933) § 7845.
6. Sayle v. Guarantee Savings & Loan Co., 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N.s.) 401 (1903);
Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 165, 52 Pac. 1067 (1898).
Contra: Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 Ill. 150, 25 N. E. 680 (1890). See
2 CLARK, RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 802; Glenn, A Study in the Dedelopmnent of
Creditors' Rights (1914) 14 COL. L. REv. 369, 384, 387. After a receiver has been
appointed, creditors can not sue to set aside fraudulent transfers [National State Bank
v. Vigo County Nat. Bank, 141 Ind. 352, 40 N. E. 799 (1895)], at least without leave
of the appointing court [Werner v. Murphy, 60 Fed. 769 (C. C. D. N. J. 1894)], and
the receiver may enjoin creditors from suing. Attorney-General v. Guardian Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 272 (1879). Nor can creditors intervene in an action brought
by the receiver. Voorhees v. Indianapolis Car & Mfg. Co., 140 Ind. 220, 39 N. E.
738 (1895). It is difficult to glean from the great mass of decisions any clearly pre-
sented criteria for determining what types of receivers are to be granted power to
sue for creditors. Receivers who are mere custodians pendente lite cannot enforce the
rights of creditors [A. B. Leach & Co., Inc. v. Grant, 27 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th,
1928), rev'd on other grounds, 280 U. S. 351 (1930) ; Felter v. Maddock, 11 Misc.
Rep. 297, 32 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1895) (partnership)], although almost all cases have
involved liquidating rather than custodial receivers. E.g., Porter v. Williams & Clark,
9 N. Y. 142 (1853) (proceedings supplementary to execution); Klingensmith v. Clow
& Sons, 273 Mich. 48, 262 N. W. 644 (1935), re''g 270 Mich. 460, 259 N. W. 312
(1935) (judgment creditor's suit) ; American & British Securities Co. v. American
& British Mfg. Co., 275 Fed. 121 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) (general creditor's bill);
Whitman v. United Surety Co., 110 Md. 421, 72 Atl. 1042 (1909) (winding-up pro-
ceedings). Custodial receivers have rarely attempted to sue even upon corporate claims
because of the passive and temporary nature of their position. While the notion that
statutory receivers possess the power to sue in the right of creditors to the exclusion
of equity receivers is current, there seems no reason for a distinction since the statutes
merely invest the receiver with title to the corporate assets, and are nothing more than
part codifications of the usages of equity authorizing the appointment of receivers in
various proceedings and defining their powers in broad terms. E.g., ARK. DIG. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, 1919) §§8603, 8606, 8615; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §5934;
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §6-601, 6-602, 6-605. Several include no provisions as to
powers. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §§10113-10124; CAL. GEN. LAWS
(Deering, 1931) Act 6507. Equity receivers are sometimes invested with title and are
often allowed to sue in the right of creditors without concern over the highly technical
issue of title. See GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 304.
7. Cf. Runner v. Dwiggins, 147 Ind. 238, 243, 46 N. E. 580, 582 (1897) ; GLENN,
LIQUIDATION (1935) § 326; 2 CLARK, RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 829. See note 6, supra.
The implication drawn from the express statutory authorization in a few states of
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NOTES
paid stock subscriptions not maintainable by the corporation because of
fraudulent representation in the inducement,8 and actions against holders of
watered stock,9 as well as the more conventional suits to set aside fraudulent
conveyances, 10 unlawful preferences," unfiled chattel mortgages, 12 and unre-
corded conditional sales,13 and to recover unlawful dividend payments. 4 receiv-
receivers' suits to set aside transactions in fraud of creditors [N. Y. REAL ProF=-v
LAW § 268 and N. Y. PFosONAL ProPERTY LAW § 19: Mo. A:. CoDe (Bagby. 1924)
art. 23, § 94] that other types of creditors' claims are unenforceable by receivers rein-
forces this tendency. The same general restriction is also imposed upin trustees in
bankruptcy. Sections 67(e) and 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act authorize him to set
aside transfers in fraud of creditors. Section 47(a) expressly confers upon him the
rights of a judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied, but the purpose of
that section is simply to allow him to sue in those states where only lien creditors can
contest the transfers. Galbraith v. First National Bank of Alexandria, 221 Fed. 3M6
(C. C.A. 8th. 1915): Barnes v. Hirsch, 215 App. Div. 10, 212 N. Y. Supp. 536
(1st Dep't 1925), aff'd. 242 N. Y. 555, 152 N. E. 424 (1926): Betzer v. Olney,
57 P. (2d) 1376 (Cal. App. 1936) : 4 RE i-n-rov. B,%.-.nKRu'rcy (4th ed. 1935) § 1404.
8. Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792. 206 N. IV. 586 (1925); State v.
Associated Packing Co., 210 Iowa 754, 227 N. W. 627 (19279).
9. See v. Heppenheimer, 55 N. J. Eq. 240, 36 Atl. 966 (1897): Berry v. Road.
168 Mo. 316, 67 S. V. 644 (1902): Whalen s. Hudson Hotel Co.. 183 App. Div. 316.
170 N. Y. Supp. 855 (3d Dep't 1918): 4 CooK, CoRaoRATiozs (8th ed. 1923) § 766.
10. Savle v. Guarantee Savings & Loan Co., et aL., 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (:.s.) 401
(1903); Powers v. C. H. Hamilton Paper Co.. 60 Wis. 23, 18 N. W. 20 (1884).
Contra: Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert. 135 Ill. 150. 25 N. F_. 6E0 (1890). See
GLEx,. LIQUmATION. (1935) § 312: Comment (1936) 45 YALF L J. 504, at 503. In
addition to the usual form of a transfer of assets either for no consideration or for
insufficient consideration, fraudulent conveyances set aside by receivers' suits have been
of varied character: Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 165.
52 Pac. 1067 (1S98) (mortgage); Gillet v. Moddy. 3 N. Y. 479 (1850) (purchase of
treasury stock); United Light & Power Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.. 85 F. (2d)
331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), cert. granted. 57 Sup. Ct. 118 (1936), dismissed per stipula-
tion. Dec. 18, 1936, (1937) 31 ILL. L. REv. 670 (excessive management fees paid by
insolvent subsidiary to parent company) ; McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U. S. 140 (1935)
(secret promoters' profits): Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495 (1881): Beach v. Beach
Hotel Corp., 117 Conn. 445, 168 Atl. 785 (1933) (unpaid stock subscriptions released
by insolvent).
11. Industrial Mutual Deposit Co.'s Receiver v. Taylor, 118 Ky. 851, 82 S. IV. 574
(1904) ; Ronald v. Schoenfeld, 94 Wash. 238, 162 Pac 43 (1917) ; GL.su, LIQUIm.MTro
(1935) § 312.
12. Cornelius v. C. C. Pictures, Inc., 297 Fed. 444 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Klingen-
smith v. Clow & Sons, 273 Mich. 48, 262 N. U. 644, re,'g 270 Mich. 460, 259 N. V.
312 (1935). When the mortgagee of a defective chattel mortgage foreclozes, the re-
ceiver is the proper party to defend in the right of creditors. H. K. Porter Co. v. Boyd,
171 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909); Bell v. New York Safety Steam Power Co., 183
Fed. 274 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
13. H. G. Craig & Co. v. Uncas Paperboard Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 Atl. 673
(1926). The receiver may also defend against actions by the vendor. In re Wilcox
& Howe Co., 70 Conn. 220, 39 At. 163 (189); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Clipper
Pub. Co., 213 Pa. 207, 62 Atl. 841 (1906).
14. Stoltz v. Scott, 23 Idaho 104, 129 Pac. 340 (1912): Metzger v. Joseph, 111
Miss. 385, 71 So. 645 (1916). Contra: Rockwood v. Foshay, C6 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A.
1937] 1231
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ers are almost universally denied authority to collect statutory double liability
of stockholders. 15 It might be argued that the action in the principal case
fell within the already expanded sphere of exceptions, since it was brought
for the purpose of replacing assets wrongfully diverted. but some difficulty
would be presented by the analogous stockholders' statutory double liability
cases, in which the stockholders have been considered "sureties" owing a col-
lateral obligation solely to creditors.
On the second issue raised by the principal case, the power of a receiver
to sue in the right of part of the creditors, the courts have divided. 10 When
such suits have been permitted, the proceeds have been distributed some-
times among all creditors17 and on other occasions only among the creditors
possessing the cause of action.' 8 Denial of power to sue has been predicated
8th, 1933), (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 286. Although the right existed at common
law, this has largely been supplanted by statutory liability. Even where the statutes
express the liability as running to the corporation and its creditors, it cannot strictly
be said that the receiver is suing in the right of the corporation for he can collect
only so much of the wrongful dividend payments as are necessary to pay the debts.
Gaunce v. Schoder, 145 Wash. 604, 261 Pac. 393 (1927).
15. Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 66 Minn. 441, 69 N. W. 331 (1896);
Farnsworth v. Wood, 91 N. Y. 308 (1883); McLaughlin v. Kimball. 20 Utah 254
(1899). Contra: King v. Pomeroy, 121 Fed. 287 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903). An important
factor in this trend has been the construction given to the common statutes codifying
common law liabilities to creditors for wrongful dividend payments and watered stock
and creating stockholders' double liability. For courts, apparently feeling that those
statutes contemplated insolvency and liquidation proceedings, have often regarded as
fatal their failure specifically to confer power upon the receiver to enforce the rights.
Cf. Rockwood v. Foshay, 66 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933). The question rarely
arises with respect to suits by receivers of national banks to enforce double liability
because of specific statutory authority.
16. The issue, of course, arises most frequently as to receivers in general winding
up proceedings rather than in judgment creditors' suits or in proceedings supplementary
to execution, where the receiver is acting solely for the petitioning creditor or creditors
and those joining in, and not necessarily for all creditors. Nevertheless, because all
creditors may join, the question is of significance even in the latter situation. In the
following cases, receivers were allowed to sue in the right of a part of the creditors:
Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 165, 52 Pac. 1067 (1898) (con-
veyance in fraud only of existing creditors) ; Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792,
206 N. W. 586 (1925) (unpaid stock subscriptions fraudulently obtained upon which
only subsequent creditors acting in reliance had causes of action) ; Berry v. Rood,
168 Mo. 316, 67 S. W. 644 (1902) (watered stock upon which only creditors who had
knowledge at time of extension of credit had rights). Contra: American Trust &
Savings Bank v. McGettigan, 152 Ind. 582, 52 N. E. 793 (1899) ; Marion Trust Co.
v. Blish, 170 Ind. 686, 84 N. E. 814, rehearing dcnied. 85 N. E. 344 (1908). Similarly
trustees in bankruptcy have been permitted to set aside transfers in fraud of only part
of the creditors. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) §324; Comment (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 504, 506-7.
17. Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 165, 52 Pac. 1067
(1898).
18. Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S. W. 644 (1902). There has been a similar split
of authority over the method of distribution of the proceeds when a trustee in bank-
ruptcy recovers property fraudulently conveyed or its value. But the majority rule
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on the theory that a contrary holding would result either in dipping into a
common fund to defray the expenses of a suit for the benefit of only a
portion of the creditor body,1 9 or in a windfall to creditors without rights at
the expense of the others. -' These objections can be overcome, however, by
limiting participation in the proceeds to those creditors vested with rights
who agree within a specified period to indemnify the receiver for the ex-
penies of the suit. Where a cause of action possessed 1w all creditors is con-
sidered too hazardous to warrant risking the fund, courts have employed a
similar technique by restricting the distribution of possible recovery to those
creditors who agree in advance to indemnify the receiver for the co;ts of
litigation.2 1 Since the number and amount of claims in the instant case con-
stituted a large proportion of the total, the court might well have allowed
the suit by adopting the suggested procedure.
Whether the power of a receiver to sue in the right of creditors should be
subjected to these restrictions is. in the final analysis, primarily an adminis-
trative problem. Frequently denial reflects a difficulty in visualizing an indi-
vidual as representing both the corporation and its creditors, and an inclina-
tion to limit the receiver to the first capacity by likening him to the common-
law assignee for the benefit of creditors.2 2 In reality, the receiver is neither
an assignee nor a representative of any of the parties, but an officer of the
court acting under its direction in the interest of all concerned.3 Refucal to
permit suits by receivers forces a race among creditors for satisfaction and
a multiplication of individual suits, annoying to the courts and unprofitable to
the creditors and defendants. 2 4 Although these difficulties might be avoided
has been in favor of equal distribution of the proceeds among all creditors of the
bankrupt. Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 504, 506, n. 17. The argument supporting
this rule, that if the assets had not been fraudulently conveyed, they might have been
available to all creditors, does not apply to the principal case of a receiver's suit on a
surety bond because the recovery sought was never an asset of the estate but a contract
right belonging to a particular group of creditors.
19. Kennedy v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 153 Ore. 646, 655, 58 P. (2d) 625,
628 (1936).
20. American Trust & Savings Bank v. McGettigan, 152 Ind. 502, 5S9, 52 N. E.
793, 796 (1899).
21. McEwen v. Harriman Land Co., 138 Fed. 797 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905); Cornell v.
Nichols & Langworthy Machine Co., 201 Fed. 320 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912); Standart Bros.
v. Ingham, 163 Mich. 106, 127 N. W. 922 (1910); 1 CLAnux, REccavus (2d ed. 1929)
§ 601, p. 823.
22. The common-law assignee usually may not set aside fraudulent conveyances, but
a statutory assignee has the power even in the absence of specific authorization by the
statute. Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 504, 509.
23. Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 335, 67 S. AN. 644, 650 (1902); Marcovich v.
O'Brien, 63 Ind. App. 101, 114 N. E. 100 (1916); Carey and Brabner-Smith, Roccivcr-
ships (1933) 27 ILL L. Rzv. 717, 718-19. Whatever power a receiver possesses comes
from the court or from statute and not from any of the parties. Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Clipper Pub. Co., 213 Pa. 207, 62 Atl. 841 (1906).
24. This situation is particularly vexatious in the case of suits to enforce the statu-
tory liability of directors for unlawful dividends or the liability of stocl:holders for
unpaid subscriptions, watered stock or statutory double liability, where the many de-
fendants can be sued individuall.,, thus giving rise to contribution suits among them.
1937] INOTES 1233
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by the institution of a representative action by one creditor in behalf of all,2 r
there is no assurance that a class suit will be brought before individual
actions. Moreover, many significant defects inhere in that device. Repre-
sentative suits will not lie if separate proof is necessary to support the claim
of each creditor, 26 but even when, as in the principal case, such proof is not
requisite, difficulties remain because of the power of the plaintiff to dis-
miss 2 7 uncertainty as to the conclusiveness of the judgment, "s and the hesi-
tancy of creditors to join until success of the suit seems assured. 20  Since
these weaknesses can be avoided by allowing a suit by the receiver, 0 he
should be permitted to collect in one orderly proceeding all that can be ob-
tained to satisfy the claims of the creditors against the corporation, including
those obligations of third parties to creditors which arose out of dealing with
the corporation.3 ' There seems no administrative justification for denying a
receiver power to assert claims similar to the one in the instant case.32 Nor
Cushing v. Perot, 175 Pa. 66, 34 Atl. 447 (1896); Comment (1935) 33 Mic. L. REv.
1059, 1064.
25. Brusselback v. Cago Corp., 85 F. (2d) 20 (1936), ccrt. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 111
(1936), (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 385; Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 118, 121,
n. 9. Virtually all states now have statutes providing for representative actions. Com-
ment (1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 564, 565, n. 3. Avoidance of multiplicity alone will not support
a representative suit; there must be a common question. Blume, The "Connon Ques-
tions" Principle in the Code Provisions for Representative Suits (1932) 30 Micu. L.
Rv. 878, 901.
26. As, for example, if damages are sought. Cherry v. Howell, 4 F. Supp. 597
(E. D. N. Y. 1931); Comment (1934) 20 VA. L. Rav. 564, 571.
27. Since creditors described but not named in the bill are not regarded as parties,
the plaintiff or plaintiffs of record are conceded absolute dominion to dismiss or settle
until other parties have intervened or a decree has been rendered. Comment (1934)
34 COL. L. REv. 118, 123; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) § 63.
28. Since decrees rendered upon a creditor's class bill are binding upon the class,
some courts in their reluctance to sanction complete individual control over the fate
of a class have conditioned the conclusiveness of the judgment on notice of the pen-
dency of the class suit or upon actual participation. Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. Ray.
118, 135.
29. A realization that costs and attorney's fees will fall on the plaintiff if he loses
will often impel other creditors to refrain from joining or to delay joining until the
suit has progressed to a point of probable success. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) § 63,
p. 279. And at any time up to the interlocutory decree, they may start separate suits
of their own. Ibid.
30. Under the guidance and direction of the appointing court, the receiver brings
actions only if they have a reasonably fair chance of success. Standart Bros. v. Ing-
ham, 163 Mich. 106, 127 N. W. 922 (1910). And he dismisses or settles only if the
court decides it to be in the best interests of the creditors. 1 CLARK, RECEIVERS (2d ed.
1929) § 583.
31. See GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 324.
32. The recommended procedure is a radical departure from present practice, for
even trustees in bankruptcy, who are generally conceded wider power to sue in the right
of creditors than receivers, have not been permitted to sue upon a surety bond affording
a contract right to creditors. Betzer v. Olney, 57 P. (2d) 1376 (Cal. App. 1936). And
trustees cannot pursue claims of creditors which at no time constituted assets of the
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should the accrual of a right of action to only a part of the creditor body stand
in the way of such actions, provided that the number of creditors is sub-
stantial and an equitable arrangement is adopted for assessing the costs of
the suit and for distributing its proceeds. Since the power of a receiver stems
from the appointing court, there is no compulsion for the courts to await
statutory authorization ;33 equity is sufficiently flexible to permit extension
of a receiver's presently restricted power to sue.
DETERMIINATION OF DOMICIL FOR INHERITANCE TAX PuRrosEs By AN
ORIGINAL AcTIoN IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT*
THE PRIVILEGE of imposing an inheritance tax on a decedent's intangible
estate, wherever located, attaches to the state of the decedent's domicil unless
the intangibles have acquired a business situs elsewhere.1 But since each
state may determine the location of domicil independently of another's find-
ings, it is possible for more than one state to tax the intangible estate of a
decedent who has maintained homes in many jurisdictions. - If the due
process of law objection to such multiple taxation is not seasonably raised,
there will be no opportunity for a review of the issue by the'federal courts 3
and even if such review is obtained, unless the appeals from the various
state proceedings reach the United States Supreme Court at approximately
the same time it may be impossible to obtain adequate relief.4 This problem
of avoiding multiple inheritance taxation, so acute for wealthy multi-state
debtor. Cf. Barnes v. Hirsch, 215 App. Div. 10, 212 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1st Dep't 1925),
aff'd, 242 N. Y. 555, 152 N. F 424 (1926) (trustee in banlkuptcy disallowed power to
sue upon the claims of 164 creditors of insolvent broker for fraud and conversion, al-
though they had assigned their claims to the plaintiff). See note 7, supra.
33. The artificiality of this constraint is indicated by an instance where a special
receiver was appointed to sue for creditors because the general receiver was deemed
powerless to maintain the action. Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed. 747, 770 (C. C. A. 1st, 1S99).
*Texas v. Florida, New York, Massachusetts et at. Motion for leave to file Bill
of Complaint granted March 15, 1937 by the United States Supreme Court.
1. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 20 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930) ; First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 234 U.S.
312 (1932) ; see Beidler v. S. C. Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1 (1930).
2. Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 (1900); Baker v. Baker, Eccles and Co.,
242 U. S. 394 (1917). Cf. In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 At. 303, cert. den.
287 U. S. 660 (1932) ; In re Dorrance's Estate, 170 At. 601 (N. J. Prerog. Ct. 1934);
Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393 (1935).
3. Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393, 397 (1935) ; In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa 151,
163 At. 303, cert. den. 287 U. S. 660 (1932).
4. The cases from each state court would come up to the Supreme Court on
different records and each record might demand a finding that the decedent vras domi-
ciled in that particular state. Unless the cases arrived simultaneously it might be impaS-
sible to reconcile this conflict. Chafee, The Federal lnterpleader Ac:t of r936 (1935)
45 YALE L. J. 1161, 1171.
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dwellers, 5 recently recurred when the taxing officials of New York, Texas,
Massachusetts, and Florida asserted the right to tax the transfer of the
intangible estate of a decedent who was claimed by each to have been locally
domiciled. 6 The situation is of particular concern to the State of Texas
both because of the alleged inadequacy of the total estate to satisfy all the
threatened taxes and because the decedent's assets within Texas' borders
are insufficient to meet its tax- an important factor since Texas may be
unable to obtain upon the representatives of the estate the personal service
requisite to extra-territorial recognition and collection of tax claims.7
Multiple inheritance taxation on the transfer of the same res may possibly
be avoided in several ways. First, one claimant state may enter a voluntary
appearance in the probate or inheritance tax proceedings before the courts
of another state and agree to abide by the determination of domicil there
made.8 Texas apparently is unwilling to follow this procedure both because
of reluctance to submit to the adjudication of a possibly hostile forum and
because there is no assurance that the other claimant states will also submit
to the single determination which is essential to an effective disposition
of the problem. Secondly, it has been suggested that the Federal Inter-
pleader Act 9 affords a means by which the executor can obtain a determin-
ation of domicil binding upon all the states.10 But serious doubt now exists
as to its applicability in this situation." Therefore, in order to facilitate the
collection of its tax, if that tax is found to be proper, Texas, resorting to a
method hitherto untried, has brought an original action in the United States
5. See Knapp, Double Domicile in Inheritance Taxation (1935) Proceedings of
Twenty-eighth National Conference, National Tax Association 201.
6. (1936) 4 U. S. L. WFFK 430; N. Y. Times, March 9, 1937, p, 14, col. 3.
7. Under the opinion in Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935),
full faith and credit must be given to tax judgments supported by personal service.
It was not decided that the clause would extend to a tax without a judgment. See
Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921) : (1936) 49 HARV. L. REv.
490; (1936) 35 MicH. L. R~v. 131.
Since Texas' Community property laws [Tax. AxN. Rav. Cxv. STAT. (Vernon,
1927) §§2578. 46191 might force the legatee to share a portion of the estate with the
deceased's wife who was cut off under the will. the legatee might prefer to waive
collection of the Texas assets rather than submit to the operation of her laws.
Reciprocal laws to assure the domicil of collecting its tax operate only if the domicil
extends the same protection to the state where the assets are located. Texas does not
do so.
8. 11 re Lydig's Estate, 191 App. Div. 117, 180 N. Y. Supp. 843 (1st Dep't 1920)
In re Lyons Estate, 117 Misc. 189. 191 N. Y. Supp. 260 (Surr. Ct. 1921) ; In re Stone's
E-tatc, 13.5 Misc. 736, 240 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Surr. Ct. 1929) ; In re Trowbridge's
Estate, 266 N. Y. 283, 194 N. E. 756 (1935).
9. 49 STAT. 1096, 28 U.S.C. §41(26) (Supp. 1936).
10. Chafee, supra note 4 at 1169.
11. The Act was held applicable in Worcester County Trust Co. v. Long, 14 F.
Stipp. 754 (D. Mass. 1936). which was reversed sub. nonm. Riley v. Worcester County
Trust Co. (C. C. A. 1st, 1937), 4 U. S. L. WEaK 950, on the ground that to implead
a tax collector who is administering a valid law is to implead the State which he repre-
sents and is therefore forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment.
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Supreme Court to determine which of the contesting states was in fact the
domicil.12
Original jurisdiction over inter-state controversies was granted to the
Supreme Court by the Constitution 3 and made exclusive by the Judiciary
Act.14 As with suits between individuals the Court has jurisdiction only if
an actual case or controversy exists :5 the plaintiff, in short, must sue to
protect or enforce rights, or to redress or prevent wrongs which invade a
legally protected interest.10 Whether such an interest is here at stake is a
question upon which there is no authority precisely in point. Although in
determining its jurisdiction over the analogous disputes involving interstate
boundaries, the Court has never clearly defined the interest at issue; it is
possible to conclude from these cases that it is the plaintiff's sovereign right
to govern the disputed territory which is protected from invasion17 despite
the objection that such rights are "political" and lence beyond the compass
of the law.1s The "political question" objection to justiciability may be ad-
dressed to the consequences flowing from the adjudication of certain rights20
or to the nature of the rights themselves."-'O Although boundary disputes
might be attacked as non-justiciable on either plane, national harmony
required their judicial settlement ;21 and the court buttressed this practical
reason for taking jurisdiction with the legal argument that the submission
of interstate controversies by the states to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
must have included controversies over sovereign rights.2 Consequently such
12. Texas v. Florida, New York, 'Massachusetts, et al. Mlotion for leave to file
bill of complaint granted farch 15, 1937.
13. U. S. CoNsT. ART. III § 2.
14. 1 STAT. SO (1789), 28 U.S.C. §341 (1934).
15. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1 (1899).
16. Cf. 'Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) ; Borchard, Justiiabil-
it (1936) 4 U. oF CH. L. REv. 1. 2.
17. See, e.g.. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657 (U. S. 1838).
18. In the extended discussion of justiciability in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
12 Pet. 657 (U. S. 1838) an effort was made by the majority to analogize the suit
to one between private individuals, but the dissent (p. 752) clearly indicates that the
plaintiff state was not suing to protect property rights in the soil nor to quiet title,
but to recover "sovereignty and jurisdiction." Subsequently that position was tacitly
recognized by the majority. Florida -. Georgia, 17 How. 478 (U. S. 1855).
See, in general, PosT, THE S1.PRsaIE COURT AND PoI.rTc.AL QUESTIONS (1936);
Field. The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts (1924) 8 Mxxv. L.
REv. 485.
19. It was suggested in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 20 (U. S. 1831)
that the bill might be doubtful since it contemplated the control of the exercise of
force by the Georgia legislature. See also Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125 (1902).
But cf. Worcester v. Georgia, o Pet. 515 (1832).
20. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657 (U. S. 1838) ; Louisiana v. Missis-
sippi. 202 U. S. 1 (1906).
21. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 639 (1S92).
22. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 743 (1838). In the Fame case it
is intimated that boundary disputes need not be considered political at all since the
factual question of the proper location of the line is all that need be decided. Sovereign
rights are controlled by that decision, but are not primarily at issue. Id. at 734, 736;
Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39. 54 (1870).
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disputes are repeatedly declared to be justiciable.2 3 It has been suggested,
however, that when the Court does employ the "political question" formula
to deny jurisdiction, it does so, not because of any substantive defect in the
suit itself, but primarily because it is a convenient device to avoid deciding
questions which it does not wish to decide.2 4 If that is true it becomes
impossible to predict with confidence when jurisdiction over litigation in-
volving sovereign rights will be declined and when it will be entertained;
yet the failure in the past to term any interstate dispute "political" suggests
reluctance to apply the formula to actions like the present one.
If the proposition is correct that sovereign interests are proper objects
of judicial scrutiny and if any invasion of them is wrongful because of the
very nature of sovereignty, it would seem that the Court has jurisdiction of
the present case. For the state of domicil's right to tax the transfer of
intangibles may be considered sovereign and, accordingly, taxation by a
non-domiciliary state would be an infraction of that sovereignty 25 resulting
in damage comparable to that in a boundary dispute when one state exer-
cises police power over territory rightfully belonging to another.20 On one
occasion, however, the Court refused to decide a similar interstate tax dispute
although a showing of justiciability in these terms could have been made.27
Since no opinion was written in that case it is possible only to speculate as
to what essentials of justiciability were absent. The decision may have been
motivated by the fear of determining political questions; or perhaps the
Court failed to discern in the dual exercise of taxing "jurisdiction" the af-
front to sovereignty which is present in boundary controversies; or, more
probably, the element thought essential and found lacking in that case was
23. New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 284 (U. S. 1831); Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, 12 Pet. 657 (U. S. 1838); Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660 (U. S. 1849):
Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478 (U. S. 1855); Alabama v. Georgia. 23 How. 505
(U. S. 1860); Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39 (U. S. 1871) ; Missouri v.
Kentucky, 11 Wall. 395 (U. S. 1870) ; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479 (1890)
Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359 (1892); Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U. S. 1 (1893);
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1 (1906) ; Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70 (1921)
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574 (1922).
24. Finkelstein, Judicial Self Limitation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 338; Further
Notes on Judicial Self Limitation (1925) 39 HARV. L. REV. 221; but cf. Weston,
Political Questions (1925) 38 HARv. L. REV. 296.
25. This reasoning follows the application of the inobilia sequintur pcrsonamn doc-
trine which the Supreme Court used in Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U. S. 204 (1930) and Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930). It is false if,
as has been suggested, the taxation of intangibles is not a jurisdictional matter. See
Buchanan and Myers, The Administration of Intangibles (1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 911;
Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation (1934) 47 HARV.
L. REv. 628.
26. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1 (1906) (conflict as to which state could
control oyster fishing in the disputed territory).
27. New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U. S. 580 (1933). Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 485 (1923) indicates that the Court will not adjudicate abstract questions
of sovereignty when a state is the moving party, but only rights of persons, property,
dominion over physical domain, or quasi-sovereign rights actually threatened or invaded.
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physical damage, actual or threatened, as opposed to sovereign affront. In
controversies other than bundary disputes the plaintiff state has sued to
protect from damage the rights of its citizens or a proprietary interest of
its own,28 and even in the boundary cases it is possible to spell out a physical
injury.2 9 In the principal case, likewise, the physical injury requirement can
be satisfied since the plaintiff may be unable to collect revenues properly
belonging to it.
Something more than tangible injury to the plaintiff is necessary, how-
ever. Legal protection from injurious activities will not be granted unless
the damage is wrongfully inflicted. 30 And the wrongfulness which saves the
justiciability of a boundary dispute may not be available in inheritance tax
cases. In boundary disputes the wrong springs from the jurisdictional im-
propriety of the dominion exercised by one of the states; but in the taxation
of intangibles, the impropriety of multiple action may be viewed not as
jurisdictional in nature but merely as the result of an arbitrary rule of con-
stitutional fairness.3' However, the elasticity of these concepts make them
so susceptible of manipulation that if the desirability of a speedy final de-
termination of this issue is sufficiently potent, the "one state tax rule" may
be deemed to have erected around a decedent's intangible estate jurisdictional
boundaries, the invasion of which constitutes a justiciable wrong when
coupled with damage. Except in these terms the damage resulting to a state
from taxation by another state when the estate of the decedent sought to
be taxed is insufficient, would not seem to be an injury against which the
plaintiff state may receive judicial protection. The Fourteenth Amendment
appears to be the only constitutional basis for prohibiting taxation by non-
domiciliary states,32 but this amendment is invoked to protect taxpayers from
an unfair levy, not to guarantee tax collection to the domiciliary state. The
fact that the rights of the taxpayer may wrongfully be invaded by the con-
28. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 (1901); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U. S. 296 (1921) (suits to restrain sexage disposal injurious to the health of citizens
of plaintiff states) ; South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904) ; Virginia
v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565 (1918): Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163 (1930)
(enforcement of interstate contracts): Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125 (1902);
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 (1923); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S.
367 (1929) (restraining interference with interstate waters); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923) (restraining state from refusing to furnish a com-
modity to another). See Coleman, The State as Defendant Under the Federal Con-
stitution (1917) 31 HAnv. L Rxv. 210.
29. Cf. Oklahoma v. Tex-as, 258 U.S. 574 (1922) where the state's proprietary in-
terest in oil and gas and river beds vithin the disputed territory was recognized.
30. See Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 270 (1912); Jeffrey Manufacturing
Co. v. Bragg, 235 U.S. 571, 576 (1915); Vegelahn v. Guntuer, 167 Mass. 92, 105,
44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896).
31. Buchanan and Myers, supra note 25.
32. See note 1, supra. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903) permitted inheri-
tance taxcation by New York state of funds owned by a resident of Illinois on deposit
in a New York bank. That case was overruled when the Fourteenth Amendment was
invoked to prevent multiple inheritance taxation. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v.
Minn., 280 U. S. 204 (1930). Cf. Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162 (1914).
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current taxation does not make wrongful the injury which the plaintiff state
will suffer.3
Similarly, no redressible wrong is suffered by Texas, if that state is
assumed to be the domicil, because of the small portion of the decedent's
assets within its borders, and its prospective inability to collect assets located
elsewhere.3 4 Yet damage may be suffered if the courts of the defendant
states adopt either of two courses. First, B's (the defendant's) courts,
instead of recognizing that A is the doicil and, in the interests of comity,
refusing to probate the will until its validity had been determined by A's
courts3 5- in which case the executor would be forced to proceed to A to
prove the will and A would be able to collect its tax extra-territorially -
might hold the decedent to have been domiciled in B. In that event, despite
a conflicting holding by the courts of A, 1 might be unable to collect its
tax.3 7 Secondly, although such a course would be extremely improbable,
B's courts might recognize that A was the domicil and yet determine the
succession according to its own laws without forcing original probate in A. 38
In that case the estate could successfully he taxed only 1 the federal aulthor-
ities except to the limited extent of the assets in Texas. The mistaken holding
under the first alternative, that the decedent's domicil is in B, is injurious
but not wrongful as to A, despite its wrongfulness as to the successor.30
The denial of comity embraced in the other possible determination is like-
wise not a wrong to A since, despite the fact that the situs of intangibles
for tax purposes is considered to be the state of domicil, their situs for the
purposes of administration is the state in which the evidences of them are
found at the death of the decedent and that state has the power to control
the succession to them.
40
Considerations of policy may be advanced both for and against the taking
of jurisdiction over this suit. The Supreme Court seems an inappropriate
forum in which to litigate such factual issues as domicil,4' yet under present
33. See note 30, supra.
34. See note 7, supra.
35. Rackemann v. Taylor, 204 Mass. 394, 90 N. E. 552 (1910); In rc Corning's
Estate, 159 Mich. 474, 124 N. W. 514 (1910).
36. Since the ancillary courts under the majority rule of comity will order the
surplus assets transmitted to the state of domicil for administration after local debts
have been paid, Texas might be doubly assured of collecting its tax in this situation.
WOERNER, THE A-RMICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (1923) § 167; but cf. Matter of
Martin, 255 N.Y. 359, 174 N. E. 753 (1930).
37. This eventuality would result from the insufficiency of assets in A and the
failure of the executor to submit to A's process.
38. The right of a state in which are located intangible assets of a non-resident
decedent to control the succession to those assets in accordance with its own laws has
been expressly recognized. Watkins v. Madison County Trust and Deposit Co. 40 F.
(2d) 91 (N. D. N. Y. 1930) ; but cf. In re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp.
336 (Surr. Ct. 1919) ; WOERNER, 10C. cit. supra note 37.
39. See note 30, supra.
40. Higgins v. Eaton, 202 F. 75 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1913) ; Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U. S.
115 (1918).
41. The danger of many suits of this sort may not be very great because of the
peculiar circumstances involved, but it is conceivable that in an original action such
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law it apparently must be the final arbiter if two state courts reach con-
flicting decisions. On the other hand, since the courts in all the defendant
states might possibly hold Texas to be the domicil, it might be considered
impolitic to rule on the case in the absence of final state action. However,
even though the present action were found to constitute a justiciable con-
troversy and a declaration that the decedent's domicil was in Texas were
entered by the Court, it is doubtful whether Texas can be assured of the
successful tax levy which it desires.42 The cases prohibiting taxation of an
intangible res by a state other than the domicil may imply that the United
States Supreme Court is the tribunal in which the ultimate determination
of domicil for tax purposes will be made.4 3 But there has been no clear
intimation that any state in which the decedent's assets are located may not
determine for itself the location of domicil for the purposes of succession
to those assets.44 Consequently unless due process is extended to require
uniform findings -of domicil for all purposes, any of the defendant states might
disregard the Supreme Court's ruling and find local domicil for succession
purposes and thus enable the executor to obtain possession of the assets
without first probating the will in Texas and submitting to Texas' process.
Further, even if the defendants' courts follow the Supreme Court's deter-
mination, only a rule of comity requires that an ancillary court which is
administering assets within its jurisdiction demand that a disputed will be
proved at the domicil before admitting it to probate locally,43 and if that rule
were ignored Texas again might be unable to procure the requisite personal
service on a successor to the estate. It would not seem possible, under exist-
ing law, for the Supreme Court either to order payment of the tax to the
domicil or to accomplish the same result indirectly by ordering the executor
to submit to Texas' process, for that would contravene the rule against extra-
territorial enforcement of a state's tax claims if not supported by an in
as this. a litigant successfully might insist on his constitutional right to a jury trial
of the issue and delay the Court's other business.
42. Since the Supreme Court could enjoin the states which were found not to be
the domicil from collecting the tax despite conflicting findings by their own courts,
no double taxation would be possible, but that in itself would not assure the plaintiff's
collection.
43. Unless such a determination were made by the Supreme Court no method
whereby double taxation could surely be avoided is apparent. Even though the Court
has not yet resolved conflicting domicil findings by two states it has generally been
assumed that it will do so if a proper ease is presented. Chafee, loc. cit. supra note 4.
Since there is no federal common law of domicil and it is possible for each state court's
determination to be indubitably correct under its own laws or on the record before
it, the Court may encounter difficulty in reaching a satisfactory conclusion. See Knapp,
loc. cit. supra, note 5; but cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 155 U. S. 125 (1902) (the rights
of two states, one of which followed the English common law of riparian rights, the
other the western doctrine of public ownership of flowing waters, determined by creating
new equitable principles).
44. But see suggestion in First Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 327
(1932) that a transfer from the dead to the living may take place only under the laws
of a particular state.
45. See note 36, supra.
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personam judgment ;4, but a determination by the Supreme Court would
almost certainly be persuasive on the state courts which would be disinclined
to permit the avoidance of the spirit of that determination by disregarding
established rules of comity. Thus, a declaration as to domicil would probably
both assure the state of domicil of collection of its tax and prevent taxation
of the transfer of the intangible estate by more than one state. But it seems
clear that any disposition which the Court may make of this suit will be
only a temporary solution of the dilemma which was created when the "one
state tax rule" was superimposed on a Federal system of government and
which will not be resolved finally until full faith and credit is given to tax
claims as well as to tax judgments and a uniform law of domicil, at least
for tax purposes, is created.
AVAILABILITY TO A SURETY OF COLLATERAL SECURITIES HELD
BY THE CREDITOR*
THE RIGHT of a surety to compel satisfaction of the principal debtor's
obligation out of liens or securities held by the creditor against the principal
may be enforced in three types of actions. At law, the surety's only remedy
is by subrogation to the creditor's cause of action against the principal after
the debt has been paid.1 Subrogation generally extends to all the rights
and remedies of the creditor,2 but when the creditor is the state or federal
government, the courts have drawn a somewhat hazy distinction between
substantive and procedural rights. Where the right is substantive in char-
acter, subrogation will be allowed, 3 but where it is of a procedural nature,
the enforcement of which would require affirmative governmental action or
involve a peculiarly governmental prerogative, subrogation will generally be
denied.4 For this reason, a surety can never compel the government to
sue,5 bring suit in the government's name,0 or avail himself of the govern-
46. See note 7, supra.
* Johnson v. Thomas, 16 F. Supp. 1013 (N. D. Tex. 1936).
1. See Kidd v. Hurley, 54 N. J. Eq. 177, 180, 33 Atl. 1057, 1058 (1896) ; ARANT,
SURETYSHIP (1931) § 77; 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1267.
2. See American Surety Co. v. State Trust & Savings Bank, 218 Iowa 1, 5, 254
N. W. 338, 340 (1934) ; 1 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed. 1905) § 324.
3. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1267.
4. See United States F. & G. Co. v. Borough Bank, 161 App. Div. 479, 486, 146
N. Y. Supp. 870, 875 (1914), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 628, 107 N. E. 1086 (1914); Comment
(1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 259; (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 492. There is a conflict as to the
right of a surety to be subrogated to the state's exemption from the Statute of Limita-
tions. Compare ARANT, SURETrSHI' § 79, with In re J. Menist Co., 289 Fed. 229 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1923), and Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 165 Tenn. 395, 54 S. W.
(2d) 964 (1932).
5. Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369, 53 Atl. 899 (1903) ; Irby v. Livingston, 81 Ga.
281, 6 S. E. 591 (1888) ; (1934) 1 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 813; cf. In re Baltimore Pearl
Hominy Co., 5 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
6. Johns v. Brodhag, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7,362 (C. C. D. C. 1804) ; United States v.
Preston, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,087 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1824).
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ment's privilege to sue in the federal courts when the requisites of federal
jurisdiction are lacking.7 Unlike the rule at law, equity does not limit the
surety's right of access to the liens and securities of the creditor until after
the debt has been paid, so that a surety may maintain an action of exonera-
tion against the principal to compel payment immediately after maturity of
the debt, whether or not action has been commenced by the creditor.8 Usually
the creditor will be joined in this action in order to receive payment, but
the authorities are divided as to whether such joinder is necessary.0 If the
principal is solvent, the surety merely obtains an order directing him to
pay;1O if he is insolvent or fraudulent or has absconded, the surety is also
entitled to the appointment of a receiver,11 equitable garnishment,"- and the
tracing of property in the hands of third persons, 13 and he may further obtain
the benefit of all liens and securities held by the creditor.14  In the latter
case he stands in the position of an equitable assignee of the creditor and
thus achieves the same results by exoneration before payment as he would
by subrogation afterwards.'8 This equitable action of exoneration will not
prevent the creditor from obtaining a judgment against the surety at law; it
merely permits the surety to compel satisfaction of the debt out of the
property of the principal before the creditor has levied execution against
7. See In re J. Menist Co., 289 Fed. 229, 232 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). A surety is
generaly subrogated to the priority accorded the state and federal governments in the
distribution of assets of insolvent principal debtors. American Tobacco Co. v. South
Carolina Nat. Bank, 15 F. Supp. 215 (E. D. S. C. 1936); In re Liquidation of Bank of
Woodburn, 149 Ore. 649, 42 P. (2d) 740 (1935) ; ARAnT, Suiurrsmw § 79. But there
is a growing tendency to deny the surety the government's statutory priority on the
ground that it is intended for the government alone. In re South Phil. St. Bank's In-
solvency, 295 Pa. 433, 145 Atl. 520 (1929) ; Arnold, An Inequitable Preference in Favor
of Surety Companies (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 278; (1931) 45 HAv. L. Ray. 399. But
see (1929) 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 120.
8. ARAi-T, SuaRE-smp § 72; AmxoLD, SUR=rYSHIP AND GuARANTY (1927) § 126.
9. See ARAxT, SuRETsHip, § 72.
10. Holcombe v. Fetter, 70 N. J. Eq. 300, 67 AtL 1078 (1905); Stephenson v. Tav-
erners, 9 Grat. 398 (Va. 1852) ; (1912) 12 COL L. REv. 555.
11. Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Bagley, 44 F. (2d) 803 (S. D. Cal. 1930); Rob-
erts v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 83 Ill. App. 463 (1899); (1928) 62 Ir. L. T.
261. But cf. Nash v. Burchard, 87 Mich. 85, 49 N. W. 492 (1891).
12. See Glades County v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 57 F. (2d) 449, 452 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1932).
13. Stulz-Sickles Co. v. Fredburn Const. Corp., 114 N. J. Eq. 475, 169 At. 27 (Ch.
1933) ; McConnell v. Scott, 15 Ohio Rep. 401 (1846) ; St. Croix Timber Co. v. Joseph,
142 Wis. 55, 124 N. IV. 1049 (1910).
14. Pinckney v. Wylie, 86 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); West Huntsville Cot-
ton Mills Co. v. Alter, 164 Ala. 305, 51 So. 338 (1910) ; Polk v. Gallant, 22 N.C. 395
(1839) ; Neal v. Buffington, 42 ,V. Va. 327, 26 S. E. 172 (1896); AnmotD, SuImT-smP
AND GuARANTY § 124; 1 BRANnr, SuRMavsne AND GUAEANT, §245. Contra: Mfary-
land Casualty Co. v. Charleston Lead Works, 24 F. (2d) 836 (E. D. S. C. 1923) (exon-
eration not permitted until after payment by the surety).
15. See Alabama Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 225 Ala. 269, 271, 142 So. 565, 570
(1932) ; Sanford v. United States F. & G. Co., 116 Ga. 6M9, 694, 43 S. E. 61, 63 (1902).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
him.'0 Where action has been commenced by the creditor, a third remedy is
sometimes given the surety, since he may restrain execution against his
property and thereby force the creditor to exhaust all the securities which
he has received from the principal debtor before levying on the property of
the surety.17 But the creditor is generally entitled to his choice of remedies
against either obligor,18 and the surety's right of action against the creditor
is, therefore, much more restricted than his right of exoneration against the
principal, for relief will seldom be permitted in these cases unless the credi-
tor has been secured against loss or delay by the surety, the principal is
insolvent, and the securities are readily available to the creditor but would
not be available to the surety by subrogation after payment. 10
Because of the diversification of remedies available to a surety, difficulty
is sometimes encountered in selecting the type of action best adapted to
the particular situation involved. This fact is illustrated by a recent case.
The surety on two refinery bonds securing the United States in the pay-
ment of processing taxes due and to become due upon oil owned by the
principal brought suit in a federal court against the principal and the federal
tax collector alleging that the time for payment had accrued, that the prin-
cipal refused to pay, and that the United States was threatening suit against
the surety. Since the only known assets of the principal were the taxed
oil, the surety prayed for the appointment of a receiver and an order directing
the tax collector to enforce the lien on the oil and to deduct the amount of
the tax from the proceeds of its sale. A receiver was appointed e.r pare,
and pursuant to a state statute regulating the production and sale of oil,
he applied to the Texas Railroad Commission for the necessary authoriza-
tion of the sale of the oil.2 The application was refused because the oil was
unlawful under the statute. On final hearing, a motion by the tax collector
to dismiss the complaint was sustained on three grounds: if the suit was
against the tax collector in his official capacity, jurisdiction failed because
it was in reality a suit against the United States and no consent had been
16. See West Huntsville Cotton Mills Co. v. Alter, 164 Ala. 305, 309. 51 So. 338,
339 (1910) ; McConnell v. Scott, 15 Ohio Rep. 401, 403 (1846) ; ARANT, SURETYSHIP § 72.
17. Robbins-Sanford Mercantile Co. v. Johnson. 166 Ark. 330, 266 S. W. 260 (1924) ;
Richards v. Osceola Bank. 79 Iowa 707, 45 N. W. 294 (1890); Philadelphia & R. R. R.
v. Little, 41 N. J. Eq. 519, 7 Atil. 356 (1886). The doctrine of Pain v. Packard, 13
Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816) -holding that if the creditor does not sue the debtor im-
mediately upon the surety's request after the debt is due, the surety is discharged -does
not apply when suit has been commenced by the principal. Comment (1928) 37 YALE
L. J. 971.
18. Davis v. Patrick, 57 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); Rowe v. Bank of New
Brockton, 207 Ala. 384, 92 So. 643 (1922); State v. American Surety Co., 179 Mlnn,
143, 228 N. NV. 613 (1930) ; STEARNS, LAW OF SURETYSHIP (4th ed. 1934) § 118; Com-
ment (1930) 15 MINN. L. REV. 95.
19. See Bingham v. Mears, 4 N. D. 437, 441, 61 N. W. 808, 809 (1894) ; ARANT,
Suamays m § 77; 4 WIuLsIo, CONTACTS § 1276.
20. TEX. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6029. This regulation has been
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. Melton v. Railroad Comm., 10 F. Supp.
984 (W. D. Tex. 1935); Johnson Refinery v. State, 85 S. W. (2d) 948 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935).
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given; if against the tax collector as an individual, there was failure of
proper parties because this defendant had no authority to enforce a tax lien
belonging to the United States;21 if against the principal alone, the court
had no jurisdiction for there was no diversity of citizenship or federal ques-
tion involved.-2
The decision is based upon clearly defined rules of federal jurisdiction
and appears to preclude further action in the federal courts, but the surety
might obtain a remedy by following any one of several courses of action in
a state court. For instance, the surety might pay the tax in order to become
subrogated to the government's lien. It is questionable, however, whether
the right of the government to foreclose the lien and thus override state
statutes prohibiting the sale of the oil,2 is of the substantive class to which
subrogation is allowed. The validity of this classification is at least arguable,
for the surety would merely require a judicial determination of his right
to have the oil sold, coupled with execution of that right by the exercise of
the state court's power to compel the Commission to authorize the sale of
the oil;24 enforcement by the United States Tax Collector would be un-
necessary.25 More likely to succeed would be an action of exoneration against
the principal, with the tax collector being joined merely to receive payment.
Since a surety may be entitled to the benefit of the creditor's lien by exon-
eration, and since the courts apparently do not make the substantive-pro-
cedural distinction in an action of this sort,2 0 it seems that the state court
could enforce that lien by ordering a judicial sale of the oil. - An alternative
method of approach under the exoneration theory would be to seek a lien
21. No suit can be commenced to recover a federal tax without the authorization
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Ray. STAT. § 3214 (1875), 26 U. S. C. § 1640
(1934) ; see also REa. STAT. §§3213, 3164 (1875), 26 U. S. C. § 1645 (1934) ; ef. Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Charleston Lead Works, 24 F. (2d) 836 (E. D. S. C. 1923); Czieslik
v. Burnet, 57 F. (2d) 715 (E. D. N. Y. 1932).
22. Johnson v. Thomas, 16 F. Supp. 1013 (N. D. Tex. 1936).
23. In a direct proceeding to foreclose the lien the government would not be impeded
by the state statute prohibiting the sale of the oil, for even in the exercise of its police
power a state cannot burden the power of the federal government to levy and collect
taxes. License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 462 (1866); United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S.
210 (1893); Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U.S. 515 (1910); In re Rosenberg, 269 N.Y.
247, 199 N. E. 206 (1935).
24. The Texas courts have power to compel authorization of the sale when the
Commission's refusal is unreasonable or arbitrary. Davenport v. Railroad Commis-
sion, 85 S. ,V. (2d) 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). Moreover, the fact that the oil is
illegal in the hands of the owner does not mean it can never be sold. By the terms of
the state statute, proceedings may be taken by the Texas Attorney General for the
forfeiture of the oil, and the purchaser at the forfeiture sale receives a valid title.
T.x. A-,xn. RE. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6066a, § 10.
25. See (1934) 1 U. or CHi. L REv. 813, 814; cf. Randolph v. Brown, 115 Ala. 677,
22 So. 524 (1897); Baker v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2196, 73 S. V.
1025 (1903).
26. See cases cited supra note 14.
27. See note 24, supra.
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on the oil, junior to that of the government, to protect the surety's right
of indemnity against the principal. 28 When the government later obtained
judgment against the surety, he could offer his lien in satisfaction of the
claim, and the court, by the doctrine of marshalling of assets, might order
foreclosure of the lien, for a surety to whom the principal has pledged pro-
perty is entitled to an equitable decree ordering its sale before execution may
be levied by the creditor upon the surety's own property.29 Even though the
surety neglected to obtain a junior lien on the oil, it is possible that in a
subsequent action by the government he might restrain execution on the
judgment until the government had foreclosed its own lien on the principal's
oil, but this theory seems somewhat tenuous in view of the statutory pro-
hibition against enjoining the levy and collection of taxes30 and the reluc-
tance of the courts to confine a creditor solely to his remedy against the
principal. 31
Regardless of the theory selected by the surety in the state court, it is
doubtful whether recovery would be permitted on the facts of the instant
case, for the court suggests that the action was the result of a collusive
agreement between the principal and the surety to enforce the sale of il-
legal oil by invoking the taxing power of the United States. Since the
remedies available to a surety are essentially equitable in their character and
are applied as the facts of the particular case demand, 32 a state court would
be justified in concluding that the immunity granted the federal government
from the provisions of state laws governing the sale of oil was for the sole
purpose of collecting taxes, and that, since these taxes could be collected
from the surety, the immunity should not be employed for the personal
advantage of any of the parties involved.
33
28. In view of a surety's general right of indemnification, there would seem to be
no objection to allowing him a junior lien on the property of the principal [cf. Pinck-
ney v. Wylie, 86 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Craighead v. Swartz, 219 Pa. 149,
67 Atl. 1003 (1907); Henry v. Compton, 39 Tenn. 549 (1859)], and such relief could
reasonably be granted in an action of exoneration. See notes 11, 12, 13, supra.
29. Hillams v. Abercrombie, 15 S. C. 110 (1879); 1 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND
GUARANTY § 246. By a Texas statute if the principal and surety are sued together, the
property of the principal must be levied upon first. TEx. ANN. REv. CIv. STAT. (Ver-
non, 1925) art. 6247.
30. REv. STAT. § 3224 (1875), 26 U. S. C. § 1543 (1934) ; cf. Czieslik v. Burnet, 57
F. (2d) 715 (E. D. N. Y. 1932).
31. See note 19, supra.
32. American Surety Co. v. Robinson, 53 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Ameri-
can Surety Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 58 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; Stratton v.
Thomas, 133 Mich. 281. 94 N. W. 1053 (1903); (1929) 15 VA. L. Ra'. 495.
33. Cf. White v. Georgia, 51 Ga. 252 (1873) ; Ramsay's Estate v. Whitbeck, 185
Ill. 550, 56 N. E. 322 (1900).
1246 [Vol. 46
THE 'NEW HAVEN REORGANIZATION UNDER SECTIoN 77*
SEcTIo 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1933 and amended in 1935,1
is primarily designed to afford to large railroad systems the unified, efficient
and inexpensive reorganization not available to them in an equity receiver-
ship with its many ancillary proceedings.2 An indication of the effects of
the 1935 amendment, which among other things limited the jurisdiction of the
court in any one proceeding to the principal debtor and its subsidiary "rail-
road corporation(s) "' and required the Interstate Commerce Commission's
ratification of the court's appointment of trustees,4 is afforded by the pend-
ing reorganization of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.
When the trustees of X, the New Haven Railroad, disaffirmed the 99 year
lease by which X operated all the properties and leaseholds of Y, the Old
Colony Railroad, an integral part of the New Haven system. Y, having been
deprived of its entire income, petitioned to be reorganized ill the principal
proceeding as a subsidiary "railroad corporation." This petition was ap-
proved without objection although X had previously pledged its entire
majority holding of Y voting stock to the Reconstruction Finance Corpor-
ation as security for loans now in default and retained its title thereto only
by virtue of a court injunction.5 At a subsequent hearing the pledgees and
others, perhaps more directly interested in Y6 requested the appointment
of an independent non-operating trustee to represent Y's interests.7 The
court, however, after considering the nature of a trustee under Section 77,
appointed the X trustees as trustees of Y subject to ratification by the Inter-
* In re New York, New Haven & Hartford R. RL, U. S. Dist. Ct. Conn., June 18,
1936.
1. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), amended 49 STAT. 911 (1935) and 49 STAT. 1969, 11 U. S.
C. § 205 (Supp. 1936).
2. C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 1801 (1936); Garrison, Reorganization of Railroads
under the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 1 U. OF Cni. L. REv. 71; Hanna, Recent Additions
to the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 1 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 448; Lowenthal, The Railroad Re-
organication Act (1933) 47 HARv. L REv. 18; Wehle, Railroad Reorganiation under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act: New Lcgislation Suggested (1934) 44 YALE L. J.
197. The 1935 amendment accomplished many basic changes in the original Act. See
Craven and Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law (1936)
49 HARv. L. REv. 1254; Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act (1936)
36 Cot. L. Ray. 27.
3. 49 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. § 205(a) (Supp. 1935).
4. 49 STAT. 911, 914, 11 U. S. C. § 205(c) (1) (Supp. 1935).
S. Since this injunction was issued to prevent a dismemberment of the New Haven
system during reorganization, it was justified. Continental 111. Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 643 (1935).
6. These included the minority stockholders' protective committee and a trustee
under various wills and other instruments for a small amuunt v.f Old C. -'ov 1?,.n i
whose sole interest lay in the Old Colony. However, the primary interest of the pledgees
who were direct creditors of the New Haven would seem to lie principally in that rail-
road system.
7. Since all the parties recognized the desirability of operation of the system as a
unit, an operating trustee was not sought by them.
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state Commerce Commission.8 Aggrieved by this decision, the pledgees not
only intervened before the Commission to urge that it refuse to ratify the
appointment because of the inherent conflict of interest between X and Y
arising from the disaffirmance of the lease, but also appealed the order of
appointment to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit alleging
for the first time that the lower court had no proper jurisdiction over Y.
After a full hearing the Commission ratified the appointment order and
thus sustained the court's interpretation of the functions of a trustee under
Section 77.9 The Circuit Court refused to hear the appeal. 10
The decision of the lower court appointing the same set of trustees to
administer the interests of both the X and Y railroads rests upon the funda-
mental difference between a trustee under Section 77 and an orthodox trustee
in bankruptcy. In the latter proceeding, which generally involves a complete
liquidation of the debtor's estate with no surplus remaining for the equity
interests, the trustee is appointed by the creditors as their fiduciary repre-
sentative;" and since, conceptually, a fiduciary may not represent adverse
interests, one set of trustees would appear incompetent to represent the
creditors of two debtors with such conflicts of interest as those of X and Y.
On the other hand, in a reorganization under Section 77, the Act provides
elaborate safeguards for minority interests,1 2 clearly indicating a Congres-
sional intent to constitute the trustee an impartial administrative agent of
the court with powers and duties similar to those of an equity receiver.
13
Thus, effective protection of any interest is not made dependent upon repre-
sentation by a trustee possessing title but upon active participation in the
reorganization by militant and independent representative committees and
trustees under mortgage indentures who may align themselves according to
their interests to press their views on the principal trustees or the court.
It is, therefore, implicit in Section 77 that only one set of trustees be ap-
pointed in any proceeding. This result, moreover, seems necessary in the
light of certain practical considerations. If special representation by a trustee
were granted one subsidiary, the court would logically be compelled to yield
similar representation first to every other subsidiary and finally to each of
countless groups of creditors, bondholders and stockholders with additional
expense, complications and disintegration of the reorganization necessary
8. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., U. S. Dist. Ct. Conn., June 18, 1936, Order
No. 75, Proceeding No. 16562.
9. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorganization, Interstate Commerce Commission,
Nov. 18, 1936, Finance Docket No. 10992.
10. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., C. C. A. 2d, Dec. 30. 1936, in reply to mo-
tions dated July 15, Dec. 5, Dec. 8, 1936.
11. See 1 GRDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1936) §§387, 389. Of course, the
orthodox trustee in bankruptcy is responsible to the equity interests for the proper ad-
ministration of the property so as to obtain as large a fund as possible and to distribute
to the equity interests all that remains after satisfaction of the creditor's claims. How-
ever, since a surplus rarely remains after satisfaction of the creditor's claims, the
trustee is usually answerable only to the creditors.
12. See, e.g., 49 STAT. 911, 917, 918, 11 U. S. C. §205(d)(e) (Supp. 1935).
13. Rodgers & Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations under Section 77
of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 571, 606.
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consequences. Yet this independent trustee, whose primary allegiance would
have to be to the parent as majority stockholder, could afford no greater
protection to those interested in the subsidiary; for, while one set of trustees
as duly appointed non-partisan administrators would be prompted by human
motives to be as fair as possible to all interested parties, the trustees of the
parent, if opposed by a subsidiary trustee might be impelled to benefit the
parent at the expense of the subsidiary, and would probably succeed because
they would be more intimately in touch with the properties than the non-
operating trustee of the subsidiary.
After the appointments in the instant reorganization had been approved
by the court as legally, equitably and economically sound and in accordance
with the intention of the Congress, 1 4 the order of approval was subject to
review in two separate fortuns. Not only is the appointment of trustees by
the court under Section 77 reviewable by the appellate court for abuse of
discretion. but the Act makes the appointments ineffective until ratified by
the Interstate Commerce Commission.15 As originally enacted, Section 77
allowed the court to continue the debtor in possession or appoint trustees
from a panel chosen by the Commission,1" but the 1935 amendment makes
the appointment of trustees mandatory' 7 and, to avoid administrative diffi-
culties present under the old scheme,' 8 substituted the requirement of rati-
fication by the Commission. While Congress may have intended the Com-
mission's ratification to be based solely on the personal qualifications of the
appointed trustees,' 9 the instant reorganization indicates that the Commission
has interpreted the statute as a grant of unlimited discretion to affirm or
veto the court's appointment; for the Commission's opinion included a re-
view of the court's interpretation of the Act as it affected the propriety of
appointing the same trustees for two debtors with such conflicts of interests
as X and y.
20
Although the Commission sustained the court's interpretation, the validity
of review by an administrative agency of a court's determination on such a
traditionally legal issue as the interpretation of a statute is without precedent.
If Section 77 does in fact authorize such a broad power of review by the
Commission, the Act might possibly involve an unconstitutional delegation
of judicial power to an administrative tribunal.2' Yet a power of review
14. Judge Hincks in In re N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., U. S. Dist. Ct. Conn., June 18,
1936. No. 16562, at 808.
15. See note 4, supra.
16. 47 STAT. 1474, 1475 (1933), 11 U. S. C. § 205(c) (1934). See also Lansdov,-n v.
Faris, 66 F. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) (appointment not mandatory).
17. 49 STAT. 911, 914, 11 U. S. C. §205(c)(1) (Supp. 1935).
18. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6Z49, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935), 51-57, 79-80, 110, 273-4, 305-306.
19. But see Friendly, supra note 2, at 40.
20. The Commission had previously approved the personal qualifications of these
appointees as trustees of the X railroad. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorganization,
212 . C. C. 75 (1935).
21. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 40; Recent Federal and Local Legislation; Amend-
2nents to Railroad Reorganization Act (1935) 3 U. or Cm. L. REv. 61, 63.
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such as asserted by the Commission in the principal case infringes judicial
authority even less than many of the other judicial powers conferred upon
the Commission by the original Section 7722 which were sustained without
qualification in the Rock Island case.2 3 Accordingly, doubts as to the legality
of the Commission's unusual powers under the amended Act, including the
power to review questions of law involved in court orders, may perhaps be
minimized.
In contrast to the Commission's significantly broad opinion, the Circuit
Court refused to hear the petitioners' appeal, 24 thereby leaving unanswered
one of the most important problems raised by the instant reorganization: for
the pledgees, although they again pressed the arguments considered above.
placed special reliance on the contention, which had not been offered to the
lower court or the Commission, that the lower court did not have proper
jurisdiction over Y under the amended Section 77.25 The original act had
provided that any corporation could be reorganized in the same proceeding
with the principal debtor if the latter owned a majority of its voting stock
or operated substantially all of its property, 2 but the 1935 amendment, which
may have been designed to exclude non-railroad subsidiaries and independent
lessors from the principal proceeding, restricted this privilege to a subsidiary
"railroad corporation." 27 Since the Act defines a "railroad corporation" as
"any common carrier by railroad engaged in the transportation of persons
or property in interstate commerce," 2 8 the pledgees maintained that sub-
sidiary lessors, like the Old Colony Railroad, are not in fact engaged in
such transportation and hence not "railroad corporations" within the mean-
ing of the Act so that they may not file in the principal proceeding.20 The
disaffirmance of the lease may be said, however, to make the lessor an
operating company and therefore a "railroad corporation" eligible for reor-
22. Rodgers & Groom, supra note 13, at 580; Hanna, supra note 2, at 459, n. 17.
23. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago. R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S.
648 (1935).
24. See note 10, supra.
25. See Intervenor's, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Assignment of Errors,
In re N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., Dec. 8th, 1936.
26. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. § 205(a) (1934).
27. 49 STAT. 911, 11 U.S.C. §205(a) (Supp. 1935). Throughout the extensive
hearings on the amendment held by the Judiciary Committee of the House, no mention
as to any possible change in this clause has been found. Hearings Before Commltlec
on the Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935). The present wording was
adopted by the Committee in executive session and received no mention in the Con-
gressional debates. A possible reason for the change is to be found in a brief filed with
the Committee by Cassius Clay, Counsel of the Railroad Division, Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, which suggested that subsidiaries not subject to the control of
the Interstate Commerce Commission should be excluded from the benefits of the Act.
28. 49 STAT. 911, 922; 11 U. S. C. § 205(m) (Supp. 1935).
29. This contention is based on a construction of the word "engaged." Several
courts have, however, permitted lessors to file in the principal proceeding. In re Den-
ver & R. G. W. R. R., Dist. Ct. Colo., petition filed, Dec. 1. 1935; In re St. Louis &
S. W. R. R., E. Diqt. Mo., petition filed Dec. 17, 1935; In re Missouri Pac. Ry, E. Dist.
Mo., petition filed June 5, 1936 (all unreported).
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ganization under 77.30 Moreover, even if the lessor may not be designated
an operating company, it could nevertheless be considered a "railroad cor-
poration" within the meaning of 77 by analogy to the Commission's inter-
pretation of an identical definition in the Transportation Act to include lessor
railroads.3' This result would not only sustain the apparent purpose of 77
but is manifestly desirable upon broader grounds. If a lessor is not a,
"railroad corporation" within the meaning of 77, it cannot avail itself of
this section of the bankruptcy act either as a principal or a subsidiary debtor
but will be compelled to reorganize under 77B. This action would compli-
cate the reorganization of both the lessor railroad and the railroad system
of which it was an integral part; for 77B, which was not designed specifically
for railroad reorganizations, neither gives the Commission authority to aid
in the reorganization nor provides for a reconciliation of conflicting regula-
tion of the debtor by the court under 77B and the Commission under the
Transportation Act. Ioreover, since lessor railroads are railroads within
the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act for the purposes of imposing
certain public duties upon them,32 there appears to be no reason to exclude
them from the benefits of a reorganization under 77. A different result
requires in the reorganization of large railroad systems a principal proceed-
ing under 77 and numerous ancillary reorganizations under 77B.- The
consequent expense, complexity and probable disintegration of the system
are repugnant to the fundamental purpose of 77.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTE IIPOSING CosT OF REGULATION
UPON PUBLIC UTILITIES*
LACK Or funds has been one of the chief factors hampering state public
ser-ice commissions in regulating public utilities.1 Because the state legisla-
30. 49 STAT. 911, 915, 11 U. S. C. §205(c) (6) (Supp. 1935). But see Friendly,
supra note 2, at 45 ft. Under the old receivership form of railroad reorganization, the
lessee's receiver was generally said to operate leased lines for the lessor's account until
he should decide whether to adopt or reject the lease. Quincy, *M. & P. I. R. v. Hum-
phrevs, 145 U S. 82 (1892); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Ry.,
282 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; Westinghouse El. & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R. T. Co.,
291 Fed. 836 (S. D. X. Y. 1922), at'd, 6 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
31. Finance Petition of Delaware & H. Co., 158 I. C. C. 615 (1930); Rock Island
System Consolidation, 193 I. C. C. 395 (1933); cf. Public Service Comm., of Md. v.
Northern Central Ry., 146 Mfd. 5SO, 127 AtL. 112 (1924).
32. See Independent Refiners* Asso. v. Western N. Y. & P. 1. Co., 6 I. C. C. 378
(1894); IVIxs AND 'MASON TnlE CONTROL OF PCI3LIC UTILITIES (1903) 582.
33. 'Many of the ancillary proceedings under 77B, as in the instant case, would
have to be laid in a district court other than that in which the reorganization of the
parent railroad is being held.
* Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 57 Sup. Ct. 397 (Feb. 1, 1937).
1. M OSHER & CRAwFon, P:nLIc UTILITY REGLLATION (1933) 67-81. See Douglas
v. Arizona Edison Co., 1 P. U. R. (x.s.) 493, 498 (Ariz. Corp. Comm., 1933); Re
Alabama Power Co., P. U. R. 1932E, 323, 328-330 (Ala. Pub. Service Comm., 1932).
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tures have hesitated to appropriate sufficient funds from the general treasury
to support the commissions, an increasing number of states have attempted
to solve the problem by apportioning the cost of supporting the commissions
among the utilities regulated by the commissions. A common technique is to
impose upon all utilities regulated, in addition to property, license and occu-
pation taxes, a fee measured by gross operating revenues derived from intra-
state business, 2 and to segregate the proceeds for the support of the state's
public service commission. This type of statute was early sustained against
attacks based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, as a reasonable scheme for
imposing the burden of supporting the services furnished by the commissions
upon the utilities for "whom the service is rendered, and to whom it is use-
ful.' Where, however, the fee is also imposed upon utilities engaged in
interstate commerce, it must not substantially exceed the reasonable cost of
regulation and inspection; otherwise the statute imposes a "direct," and there-
fore unconstitutional, burden upon interstate commerce. 4 But a modicum of
2. Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., Ga., Idaho, Ky., La., Mont., N. D., Ohio, Ore., S. C.,
Tenn., Utah, Va., Wash., and W. Va. have statutes imposing such fees on one or more
types of utilities. Another common method for raising revenue is to charge utility
companies with all or part of the cost of special investigations or of appraisals (or both)
made by public service commissions. This method is employed in varying forms among
the following states: Ala., Ariz., Idaho, Ill., Iowa, Kan., La.. Mich., Mo., N. H., N. Y.,
Ohio, R. I., Vt, Wis. and Wyo., and the District of Columbia. It has generall) withstood
attacks under the due process and equal protection clauses. Wisconu.in Tel. Co. v. Pub.
Service Comm., 206 Wis. 589, 240 N. W. 411 (1932), aff'q Re Assessments v. Public
Utilities, P. U. R. 1932B, 314 (Wis. Pub. Service Comm., 1931) ; Bronx Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. Maltbie, 268 N. Y. 278, 197 N. E. 281 (1935), rev'g 244 App. Div. 859,
280 N.Y. Supp. 569 (3d Dep't 1935), (1936) 21 CORx. L. Q. 380: Washington Ry. &
Electric Co. v. District of Columbia, 77 F. (2d) 366 (App. D. C. 1935). Contra: Wash-
ington v. Northwestern Electric Co., 183 Wash. 184, 49 P. (2d) 8 (1935), (1936) 34
MicH. L. REv. 1255, 101 A. L. R. 197; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub.
Service Comm., 15 F. Supp. 1057 (E. D. La., 1936) (statute construed to apply only
to corporations, and held, therefore, to violate equal protection clause).
3. Charlotte, C. & A. R. R. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 394 (1892); People ex tel.
N. Y. Electric Lines Co. v. Squire, 145 U. S. 175 (1892). Modern proponents of the
benefit theory of taxation point out that by assessing the cost of regulation against the
utility, the expense will ultimately be borne by the consumer rather than by the public
at large, many of whom have no direct interest in utility regulation. See Moslmit &
CRAwFoRD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 81; H. R. REP. No. 2240, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927).
4. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64 (1904); see Pure Oil Co. v. Min-
nesota, 248 U. S. 158, 162 (1918) ; cf. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S.
489, 493 (1887).
In order to sustain the fees, where not substantially in excess of the reasonable cost
of inspection and regulation, as against the contention that they impose a "direct" bur-
den upon interstate commerce, the Court has relied upon the exception granted in U. S.
CONST. ART. I, § 10, that "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws . . ." Although that clause applies only to foreign com-
merce [Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S., 1869)], the Court has held that
". .. the same principle must apply to interstate commerce." Patapsco Guano Co. v.
North Carolina Bd. of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345, 361 (1898). The Court, accordingly,
has cited cases, whether involving interstate or foreign commerce, interchangeahly. The
flexibility is allowed: the amount of the fee need not be exactly equivalent
to the cost of regulation :5 nor need it be imposed after the regulation has
taken place, 6 for if the sums collected before the regulation prove to be
excessive, the Court presumes that the legislature will act in good faith and
reduce the rate so as to approximate the cost of regulation.7 Finally, since the
tax is presumed to be reasonable.3 the burden has been placed upon the com-
plainant to demonstrate that the revenues collected are so "disproportionate
to the services rendered as to attack the good faith of the law."
A recent decision of the Supreme Court, however, has seemingly reversed
this presumption of constitutionality' The State of Washington imposed
upon all utilities doing business in the state a fee of one-tenth of one per
cent of gross operating revenues derived from intrastate operations." The
sums thus collected were commingled in a revolving fund to defray all tile
expenses of the Department of Public Works. No separate accounts were
kept of the amounts expended upon the regulation of each type of utility or
of the amounts spent for each activity of the department. The plaintiff rail-
road sought to recover fees paid under protest on the ground that the statute
imposed an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce and violated
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It comtended that this commingling of total revenues and the expenditure of
a portion of them for such allegedly non-regulatory functions as the activities
of the department in the interest of interstate shippers and in the trial of
reparation cases placed upon the state the burden of demonstrating that the
fees collected from railroads did not exceed the sums expended in their "legiti-
mate" regulation. At the trial the department's auditor had testified from
unofficial records that the disbursements chargeable to the railroads from 1929
to 1933 exceeded the receipts from them in the same period by $37,833.00.
result has been to confuse "a power [which] has been granted to be used in exceptional
conditions" with a "field of general legislative power, with every presumption of validity
back of it." Cardozo. J., dissenting in Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 57 Sup. Ct.
397, 405.
5. Atlantic & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 165 (1903); see Foote
& Co. v. Stanley. 232 U. S. 494, 504 (1914).
6. See note 5. supra.
7. Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345, 354 (1S93) ; Red "C" Oil
Co. v. Board of Agri., 222 U.S. 380. 393-394 (1914): see Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232
U. S. 494. 503-504 (1914).
8. Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope. 187 U. S. 419, 425 (1903); Atlantic &
Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia. 190 U. S. 160, 165 (1903) ; Red "C" Oil Co. v. Board of
Agri., 22 U. S. 380 (1912); Pure Oil Co. v..Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158, 162 (1918).
9. New 'Mexico cx rl. McLean v. Denver & R. G. R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 33, 55
(1906): Red "C" Oil Co. v. Board of Agri., 27 U.S. 3S0, 393 (1912); see Patapsco
Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345, 354 (1898).
10. Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 57 Sup. Ct. 397 (1937) (Hughes, C. J.,
and Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, J.J.. dissenting). (1937) 4 U. oF Cni. L. REV. 05,
rcv'q 184 Wash. 648. 52 P. (2d) 1274 (1935).
11. W\ASH. REV. STAT. Axx. (Remington. 1932) §§ 10417. 1041S. Auto transporta-
tion companies pay a tax of one percent (ld.. § 6395), and steamboat companies one-fifth
of one percent (Id. § 10361-2).
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But his figures included, without segregating, the expenditures upon the
allegedly non-regulatory activities. Mr. Justice Roberts, writing the majority
opinion, held for the plaintiff on the ground that although the statute was
valid on its face, nevertheless, because the state had commingled costs prop-
erly chargeable to the utilities with other costs not so chargeable, it had the
burden of proving that the sums exacted from the railroads did not exceed
the reasonable cost of the proper regulatory functions; and it had failed to
sustain this burden. Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote a dissenting opinion in which
three justices concurred .
2
Although the decision turned upon the allocation of the burden of proving
the reasonableness of the fees, there is a broader significance in the implied
assumption that if a state includes all types of public utilities in a single class
for the purpose of computing these fees, they will be declared unconstitu-
tional upon proof that the exactions from any group of utilities are in excess
of the disbursements for that particular group. This segregation into groups
seems to be an unwarranted innovation. It is not clear whether a dispropor-
tionate fee for a particular group of utilities is deemed a "direct" burden
upon interstate commerce or a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or both. In view of the fact that Washington's
"occupation" tax, imposed upon all persons, including utilities, doing busi-
ness in the state, and measured, like the tax in the instant case, by gross
operating revenue from intrastate business, had been recently upheld by the
Court against attacks based upon the interstate commerce clause, 13 that
clause would seem to supply no independent ground of attack. The controlling
factor appears to be that because the present tax was not paid into the gen-
eral treasury, it came within the prohibition of the due process clause against
taxing "one group for the benefit of another.' 1 4 But if it is constitutional
to exact more from one railroad than is expended in regulating that road,
there would seem to be equal justification for sanctioning the exaction of
more from all railroads than is expended in their regulation, so long as the
total amount collected from all utilities does not substantially exceed tile total
expenditures of the commission in regulating them. For, in practical effect,
just as one railroad is materially benefited by expenditures for regulation of
12. The principal ground of dissent was that Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494
(1914), relied upon by the majority, was inapplicable to the present situation. That deci-
sion was based upon ART. I, § 10 of the Constitution, which expressly limits the allow-
able fees for purposes of "inspection" (see note 4, supra), whereas there is concededly
nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or interstate commerce clause which prohibits
the imposition of fees covering the cost of both inspection and regulation of the intra-
state activities of public utilities. See Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 57 Sup. Ct.
397, 402 (1937). Moreover, it was demonstrated in the Foote case that the inspection
fees actually did exceed the reasonable cost of inspection. See (1937) 4 U. or Cut. L.
Rav. 505, 506.
13. Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 297 U. S. 403 (1936), (1936) 34 Minn.
L. REv. 1263, 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 425, 902, 105 A. L. R. 1.
14. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 61 (1936) ; see Railroad Retirement Board
v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330, 350, 357 (1935). But see Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash-
ington, 243 U. S. 219, 244-245 (1917); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104,
110-112 (1911).
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competing railroads, all railroads derive substantial benefit from disburse-
ments for regulation of competing methods of transportation 15
In addition to the unpersuasive character of the premises of the Court's
opinion, there are certain practical objections to the result to which these
assumptions lead. Just as the difficulty of making cost allocations may have
supplied at least one reason for originally considering all railroads as a single
class, a similar difficulty today would seem to supply a sufficient justification
for permitting the modern enlarged public service commission to treat all
utilities in a single class for the purpose of computing this type of tax. To
insist that the commissions allocate portions of many of their cost-items to
each type of utility, is to run afoul of the unniastered science of allocating
joint costs-an expensive and necessarily arbitrary process furnishing a fertile
source of litigation.1" A further objection is that, since the rates are set in
advance, an accurate correspondence annually, or over a short span of years,
between exactions from and expenditures upon each class would seem impos-
sible. This difficulty may, however, be avoided if the decision in the principal
case is construed as limited to situations where so-called non-regulatory func-
tions are financed out of the proceeds of these tax levies. In that event, a
prior line of Supreme Court decisions could be relied upon which established
the presumption that the legislature will in good faith decrease the rates
should they prove to be substantially in excess of the reasonable cost of
regulation.'
7
15. This is true of other types of utilities, as, for example, gas and electric com-
panies. Cf. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 63, 72 (1935). The various
classes of utilities are not isolated monopolies, but rather competitors in a real sense.
And the court in the Butler case conceded that "the expropriation of money from one
group for the benefit of another . . . is constitutional when imposed to effectuate regu-
lation of a matter in which both groups are interested and in respect of which there is
a power of legislative regulation.' U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 61 (1936), cited note
14, supra.
16. See Canning, Cost Accounting, (1931) 4 Excyc. Soc. SCIEcv.s 475, 477. The
Vashington commission has secured the passage of a new law which it hopes will
circumvent the difficulties created by the decision in the principal case. The statute
differentiates the seventeen types of utilities regulated into five classes. It empowers
the commission to decrease the annual rates "for any . . . class of companies" "to
the end that the fees . . . from the several classes . . . shall be approximately the
same as the reasonable cost" of regulating each particular class. . R. Btu. No. 510,
25th Regular Sess. (Wash. Legislature, 1937) (Passed, March 15, 1937). Although
the statute does not meet the apparent prohibition against treating more than one type
of utility in a single class for the purpose of computing the tax, the department hopes
to obviate even this difficulty by establishing a cost accounting system at an estimated
annual expense of $4,000 which would disclose the cost of regulating each type of
utility. Communication from the Washington Dept. of Pub. Service to the YA.r Lw
JoLRNxAL, Feb. 19, 1937. Despite the necessarily arbitrary character of any such cost
accounting system, if the allocations are accorded the presumption of correctness, they
would probably survive attack. Certainly they would be accorded more probative effect
than that accorded the testimony of the department's auditor in the principal case.
See Great Northern Ry. v. Washingtun, 57 Sup. Ct. 397, 400, 404, 406 (1937).
The bill, however, offers no solution to the problem of financing those of the depart-
ment's functions held in the principal case to be non-regulatory.
17. See note 7 -rupra.
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The most formidable obstacle to any scheme for financing public service
commissions solely from fees collected'-from the utilities arises out of the
Court's acceptance, without inquiry, of an unwarrantedly restricted definition
of the regulatory process. Certainly the department's activities in decreeing
refunds of overcharges' 8 and in appearing b, fore the Interstate Commerce
Commission in matters pertaining to interstate--transportation affecting the
citizens of Washington,'0 do not appear- to be so unrelated'to state super-
vision of railroads as to render it unreasonable, and.therefore a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to charge the costs of',these activities against
the railroads rather than the general public.2 0 Furthermore, even should
these functions be financed entirely out of legislative appropriations from
the general treasury, the difficulties of allocating joint costs between the
regulatory and non-regulatory activities would still be faced. Thus the Court
has effectively hamstrung a widely accepted method of financing public ser-
vice commissions by resorting to a highly tenuous interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and by apparently abandoning the rule of constitutional
law-so often honored in the breach-which accords the operation of a state
statute every presumption of constitutionality.
LIABILITY OF STOCK BROKERS ExncLurI.Ni, GIVE-L'' ORDERS*
THE SO-CALLED give-up order has developed in order to permit a cus-
tomer who: has an account with one stock broker to give orders for that
account througl another broker. Thus, if a customer whose account is with
broker A finds 'it more convenient to go to the office of broker B, he places
his order with B and gives up A.. Before executing the order, B, the trans-
mitting broker, telephones A, the recipient broker, and says "We have a
give-up order to buy 100 Steel for the account of Siniith." If the customer's
account is sufficiently margined, the recipient broker answers "He is o.k.,"
18. See WASH. REV. STAT. AnN. (Remington, 1932) §§ 10433-10439. These sections
have since been repealed, and a new section substituted. Id. (Supp., 1936) § 104333.
19. For examples of this type of activity, see TENTn ANN-,UAL REPORT (Dept. of
Pub. Works of Wash., 1931) 5-9.
20. Since the Court did not discuss the distinction between its regulatory and non-
regulatory functions. it is difficult to discover its precise basis. By terming the depart-
ment's duty of decreeing refunds from overcharges a judicial act [see Great Northern
Ry. v. Washington, 57 Sup. Ct. 397, 399 (1937)], the Court may have intended to
establish a distinction between the department's judicial and its legislative functions.
Cf. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 233 U. S. 479. 486 (1914).
The distinction would seem irrelevant here. since the one is as essential an aspect of
the regulatory process as the other. Secondly, the basis for the differentiation may
have been the fact that the other function of the department which the Court termed
non-regulatory-that of participating in hearings before the 1. C. C. in matters per-
taining to interstate transportation affecting the citizens of Washington-is not indulged
in by it as a matter of right but at the pleasure of the Commission. To suggest these
differences, however, is far from supplying legal justification for the Court's ruling.
*Katenkamp v. Townsend, 160 Misc. 118, 289 N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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and makes a note of the order on the customer's margin card. The trans-
mitting broker buys on the exchange from a third broker, X, and then sends
the recipient broker a confirmation notice of the purchase. The stamping
of this notice by the recipient broker constitutes, as between the transmit-
ting and recipient brokers, an acceptance by the latter of the give-up. When
X is given the name of the recipient broker, he sends a confirmation notice
to the latter. The acceptance of this confirmation completes the bargain
between X and the recipient broker, in fulfillment of which the recipient
broker takes delivery and makes payment. Finally, the recipient broker
charges the purchase to the customer's account, and pays half the com-
Iission to the transmitting broker.'
When a give-up order results in a loss, this is generally borne by the
customer. But if the customer is financially unable to pay, or if he can
prove that the order was unauthorized, the loss will fall upon either the
transmitting or the recipient broker, since X, in any event, is fully pro-
tected." The incidence of this loss is determined largely by brokerage cus-
toM.3 Prior to the execution of the order, the only function of the recipient
broker is to state over the telephone the condition of the customer's account.
If this statement is treated as a representation of present fact, it would
impose upon the recipient broker no liability for subsequent changes in the
account. However, the recipient broker alone is in a position to watch and
control the customer's account, and the parties contemplate allocation to
him of complete responsibility for the customer's failure to complete the
transaction because of financial reasons. But since the transmitting broker
can determine much more easily whether the order has been authorized by
the customer, and since in actual practice the recipient broker relies on the
transmitting broker for this determination, the latter should hear any loss
resulting from an unauthorized order.
In a recent case, 4 the transmitting broker executed a give-up order for
the purchase of stock rights, which had been placed by the husband of the
1. For a further description of the give-up order, see MER.n, L'w oF STOCK-
BROKERS AND STocK ExCIANGES (1931) § 123. Give-up orders may be either to pur-
chase or to sell, but this discussion will be limited to purchase orders, as there are no
material differences for present purposes.
2. Since brokers deal on the exchange as principals, the transmitting broker is
bound to X, despite the fact that the order is a givc-up. According to the usual practice,
the name of the recipient broker is not given up to X until comparison tickets are
exchanged between X and the transmitting broker; and acceptance by the recipient
broker does not discharge the transmitting broker, since this kind of substitution of
principals is not permitted. Rules of the Governing Committee of the New York Stod:
Exchange, Chap. II, Section 8. However, there is a substitution of principals in the
rarer case where the name of the recipient broker is given up on the floor of the
exchange. Rules of the Governing Committee of the New York Stock Exchange, Chap.
I, Section 14.
3. Statements made in this note regarding brokerage custom are based upon corn-
munications irom various brokers to the Y.%toE L. w Jot'Awt.
4. Katenkamp v. Townsend, 16O 'Misc. 118, 289 X. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1935),
aff'd. 247 App. Div. 864. 288 N.Y. Supp. 744 (lst Dep't 10u, motion for lcavo to
appeal to Court of Appeals denied, 248 App. Div. 564. 238 N. Y. Supp. 1061 kst Dep't
1936), leave to appeal denied by Court of .lppeals. 271 N. Y. 064 (1936).
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customer without due authorization from her. After the recipient broker
accepted the confirmation notice from X and took delivery, his customer
refused to pay the purchase price. Meanwhile the rights had expired. To
recover his loss, the recipient broker asserted against the transmitting broker
a claim framed in two counts.5 The first was for negligent misrepresenta-
tion of the validity of the order.6 The second, relying upon a prior case
holding that the transmitting broker acts as an agent for the customer,7
was for breach of an agent's implied warranty of authority.8 The court
granted judgment for the full amount of the loss,0 without reference, how-
ever, to either of the claimant's theories. Instead, it treated the relationship
between the two brokers as one of implied contract in which the transmit-
ting broker assumed absolute liability for unauthorized orders. This seems
the better approach, for if the recipient broker were shown to have acquired
knowledge of facts indicating lack of authority prior to the moment he
bound himself to X by accepting his confirmation notice, his action for
breach of warranty or misrepresentation might fail, since knowledge of the
truth is a defense.' 0 But because of the rapidity with which the whole trans-
action occurs, the recipient broker would rarely acquire information giving
rise to suspicion of improper authorization before accepting the confirma-
tion notice from X. It would appear preferable, therefore, to avoid injecting
5. See Record on Appeal, p. 18 et seq., Katenkamp v. Townsend, 247 App. Div.
864, 288 N. Y. Supp. 744 (1st Dep't 1936).
6. See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42
HARV. L. REv. 733.
7. In Sartorius v. Cohen, 249 N. Y. 31, 162 N. E. 575 (1928), the give-up order
was to sell 10,000 bushels of December wheat, from the customer's long account. The
transmitting broker did not promptly report the give-up order to the recipient broker.
The price rose, and the customer instructed the recipient broker, who was unaware of
the previous give-up order, to sell the same 10,000 bushels. The customer then attempted
to disclaim his order to the transmitting broker on the grounds the latter was negligent
in failing to report the give-up. The transmitting broker was held to have acted as
agent for the customer, and therefore entitled to recover his loss from his principal.
8. Moore v. Maddock, 251 N. Y. 420, 167 N. E. 572 (1929) ; 1 MECHEM ON AGEtNcY
(2d ed. 1914) § 1362 et seq.
9. Since the stock rights became valueless by expiration almost simultaneously
with the recipient broker's receipt of knowledge of the lack of authority, the damages
under either of the counts would probably be the full loss. However, if the rights had
not expired, the recipient broker would be expected to sell the rights within a reason-
able time after the customer refused absolutely to ratify the purchase. Had the recipient
broker failed to sell promptly, his maximum recovery would probably have been only
that part of his loss represented by the difference between the price at which the rights
were purchased for the customer's account and the market price either at the moment
of the customer's refusal to ratify or at the expiration of a reasonable interval of time
thereafter.
10. Knowledge by the plaintiff is a defense to an action for breach of an agent's
implied warranty of authority, MECHEM ON AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1369, and to an
action for misrepresentation, Green, Deceit (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 749, 763. Under
these theories, if the plaintiff expends money for the benefit of the defendant after
acquiring knowledge that he is not bound to do so, he becomes an intermeddler and
cannot recover his voluntary payments, even though they benefit the defendant.
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the issue of knowledge into the trial as a path of escape for the transmitting
broker. 'Moreover, since the transmitting broker is already irrevocably bound
to X after execution of the give-up order, his position cannot be made worse
if the recipient broker completes the transaction first and disputes liability
afterwards. Consequently, it appears more reasonable to view the relation-
ship of the brokers in terms of an implied contract - based upon the division
of commissions as mutual consideration- which allocates to the transmitting
broker liability for loss resulting from unauthorized orders, and to the re-
cipient broker liability for loss caused by the insufficiency of the account.
CONTEMPT OF COURT IN PUBLICATIONS APPEALING FOR FUNDS*
A LONG and bitter controversy within an independent local union led to
a fight with knives between two of the members. After one of the combatants
had been indicted for this assault, his friends, including two of the defendants,
attempted to solicit funds to obtain counsel for his defense. To this end,
defendant Piesco hired defendant Felicani, a commercial printer, to print
a circular which was distributed among members of the brotherhood, and
defendant Woodbury sent a mimeographed letter to locals of the union in
other counties. Both publications charged, in appealing for funds, that the
case was franied up by the "gangster leaders" of the brotherhood but made
no mention of the court or its officers. All three defendants, in proceedings
commenced by the District Attorney, were adjudged in contempt of court.
This judgment was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
on the ground that the publications were likely to breed prejudice among
prospective jurors and popular distrust of the court's capacity to do justice.'
The punishment of individuals for contemptuous publications involves two
conflicting social policies. 2 To safeguard against judicial tyranny, there exists
the privilege of free speech permitting individuals to indulge in reasonable
criticism and discussion of judicial action.3 On the other hand, to insure
that the judicial system will be reasonably immune from popular prejudice
and respected and obeyed by the public, the courts possess a power, usually
said to be necessary and inherent, to punish abuses of the privilege as con-
tempts of court.4 The courts, seldom explicitly weighing these two policies,
*lVoodbury v. Commonwealth, 3 N. E. (2d) 779 (Mass. 1936).
1. Ibid., (1936) 16 BosToN U. L. RX. 959, (1935) 35 CoL L. Rm. 1143, (1936)
50 HA~v. L. REv. 355.
2. See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255, 278 (1923); State v. American-News Co.,
266 N. V. 827, 832 (S. D. 1936) ; Comment (1925) 20 I. L REV. 190.
3. Nixon i% State, 207 Ind. 426, 440, 193 N. E. 591, 596 (1935); State v. Circuit
Court, 97 Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193 (1897); see State . Bee Publishing Co., 60 Neb.
282, 296, 83 N. NV. 204, 206 (1900).
4. Francis v. Virgin Islands, 11 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) ; State v. Shep-
herd, 177 Ifo. 205, 76 S. NV. 79 (1903) ; see State v. Nelson, 29 N. D. 155, 162, 150
N. AV. 267, 269 (1914).
5. See THOMAS, PROBLEMIS Or CONTEMPT or CouRT (1934) 21.
1937] NOTES 1259
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
have generally sought to resolve the conflict by the application of either of
two formulae. On the one extreme, as in the instant case, the test is said to
be whether, irrespective of the truth of the publication or its actual or in-
tended effect,0 it has a "reasonable tendency" to interfere with a conceptually
ideal administration of justice.7 Thus, the contempt power has been used to
maintain a judicial system in which popular prejudices have no influence,8
all good causes of action may be litigated without intimidation of the parties,0
decisions are based solely on judicially admissible evidence, 10 unbiased and
uncorrupted juries are readily impanelled, 11 the whole truth is obtained from
unfearing and uncorrupted witnesses,12 and to which the public accords
respect and obedience.' 3 At the other extreme, a publication is not viewed
as contemptuous unless it actually obstructs the judicial process, 14 considera-
tion being given in doubtful cases to the intent and motive of the publisher
as well as to the situation in which the publication. appeared. 10 Under this
more limited interpretation of the contempt power, the contemptuous char-
acter of a publication has been denied on appeal where a judge's handling
6. It is generally presumed that the defendant intended the natural and probable
consequences of his acts. State v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 671, 69 Atd. 1057, 1058
(1908); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 449, 453, 74 N. E. 682,
684 (1905). Contra: King v. Editor of the Daily Mail, 44 T. L. R. 303 (K. B. 1928)
cf. In re Spooner, 5 Rog. C. H. R. 109 (N. Y. City Ct. 1820).
7. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 421 (1918); State
v. Lovell, 117 Neb. 710, 718, 222 N. IV. 625, 628 (1929); Sturoc's Case, 48 N. H.
428 (1869).
8. United States v. Craig, 266 Fed. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1920): In re Shuler. 210
Cal. 377, 292 Pac. 481 (1930); see King v. Almon, WILMOT, OPINIONs AND JUDG-
IIENTS 243, 255 (K. B. 1765).
9. Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates 441 (Pa. 1802); see Re Thomas Shipping
Co., 144 L. T. R. 104, 106 (Ch. 1930). This power might be used to prevent boycotts
of such parties as the Schechter Bros., since parties with good causes of action similar
to the Schechters' cause would be deterred by this boycotting, from bringing their
actions. See N. Y. Times, May 24, 1936, p. 35, col. 6; cf. Sturoc's Case, 48 N. H. 428
(1869).
10. In re Independent Pub. Co., 240 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Telegram
Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445 (1899) ; In re Simmons,
248 Mich. 297, 226 N. W. 907 (1929); see King v. Tibbits, [1902] 1 K. B% 77, 89.
11. In re Lee, 183 Atl. 560 (Md. 1936); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth,
188 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682 (1905); Bee Publishing Co. v. State, 107 Neb. 74, 185
N. W. 339 (1921).
12. In re Lindsley, 75 Cal. App. 122, 241 Pac. 934 (1925); Field v. Thornell,
106 Iowa 7, 75 N. W. 685 (1898) ; cf. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U. S. 1873).
13. In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 714, 76 S. E. 397, 419 (1912) (judge criticized
court that reversed him); Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781 (1926); State
v. Nelson, 29 N. D. 155, 150 N. W. 267 (1914).
14. Nixon v. State, 207 Ind. 426, 193 N. E. 591 (1935); Queen v. Payne, [1896]
1 Q. B. 577.
15. In re Cottingham, 66 Colo. 335, 182 Pac. 2 (1919); Herald-Republican Pub-
lishing Co. v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 Pac. 624 (1913). King v. Editor of the Daily
Mail, 44 T. L. R. 303 (K. B. 1928).
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of his court was criticized, 16 where a party to a pending case published the
judge's political connections with the suitor's political opponents,17 where
an attorney's handling of a pending case was ridiculed,18 where the allega-
tions of a complaint suppressed by the court were published,10 where the
court's appointment of a receiver was criticized, -0 and where- after one of
a long series of articles had been made the grounds of a libel suit- similar
articles were published.21
In "Massachusetts, the power to deal with contempts is exercised by the
application of formulae based solely on the publication's tend1icy to obstruct
justice, and not its actual obstruction, the purpose being to vindicate "public
authority and the majesty of the law." -22 But it has often been said that
such a vindication is not justified if merely to protect the judge from
personal criticism but is proper only if necessary for the protection of liti-
gants and possible litigants.23 It is difficult, however, to restrict the exercise
of this power to the latter function, since almost any comment on pending
judicial proceedings may be said to have a tendency to impair public con-
fidence in the courts. Consequently the protection of the privilege of free
speech is dependent in the trial court almost entirely on the discretion of
the judge. This protection, moreover, may often be of little significance,
since the interested judge, who usually tries the contempt proceedings with-
out a jury,2 may be influenced by the sting of criticism.25 Therefore, if the
appellate courts are to protect the privilege of free speech while punishing
16. Haines v. District Court, 199 Iowa 476, 202 N. NV. 268 (1925); In re Hickey,
149 Tenn. 344, 258 S. XV. 417 (1924); Er Parto Green, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 576, 81 S. '%V.
723 (1904). But cf. In re Glauberman, 107 N. J. Eq. 384, 152 At]. 650 (1930).
17. State v. New M1exican Ptg. Co., 25 N.M. 102, 177 Pac. 751 (1918). Contra:
State v. Edwards, 15 S. D. 383, 89 N. NV. 1011 (1902).
18. State v. American-News Co., 266 N. NV. 827 (S. D. 1936). But cf. In re
Lindsley, 75 Cal. App. 122, 241 Pac. 934 (1925).
19. In rc Times Publishing Co., 276 'Mich. 349, 267 N. NV. 858 (1936). Contra:
United States Y. Providence Tribune Co., 241 Fed. 524 (D. R. I. 1917).
20. Nixon v. State, 207 Ind. 426, 193 N. E. 591 (1935).
21. The King v. Editor of the Daily Mail, 44 T. L. R. 303 (K. B. 1928).
22. See Hurley v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 443, 445, 74 N. E. 677, 678 (1905).
This concept, developed in cases where the act was clearly contemptuous, is applied
in the instant case to a different type of situation without consideration of freedom
of speech as a possible justification. Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230 (1873) (receiver
misapplied funds in the hands of the court); Hurley v. Commonwealth, mipra (jury
bribing); Blackenburg v. Commonwealth, 260 Mas- 369, 157 N. E. 693 (1927) (per-
jury).
23. Fellman v. Mercantile F. & M. Ins. Co., 116 La. 723, 41 So. 49 (1905); see
King v. Davies, [1906] 1 K. B. 32, 40; Note (1932) 81 U. oF PA. L Rav. 214.
24. In Massachusetts, as in many other states, jury trial of contempt cares is un-
constitutional. 'Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429 (1920).
25. It is often said to be the better practise for a judge to decline to sit on a
contempt case in which he is interested. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517,
539 (1925); Ex parle Pease, 123 Tex. Cr. R. 43, 47, 57 S. W. (2d) 575, 577 (1933).
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abuses of it,2 6 a formula which fails to consider the intent of the publisher
and the circumstances which underlay a publication tending to obstruct the
judicial administration seems grossly inadequate.2 7 Thus, some courts have
recognized that a particularly liberal privilege of free speech might be per-
mitted in election campaigns for judicial offices,28 petitions for recall of
judges, 29 attorneys' arguments requesting a change of venue or judge be-
cause of prejudice,2 0 and even in situations of great stress or excitement.31
In the instant case, the formulae of the Massachusetts precedents are
uncritically applied to a new situation in which a realistic consideration of
the probable motives of the publishers and the result of the publication seem
particularly apposite. Since the publication, which dealt with a situation that
had fomented a great deal of antagonistic feeling on both sides, was cir-
culated only among members of the union who were already interested in
the matter,3 2 and since the letter was distributed entirely outside the venue
of the court, the effect on possible jurors was probably inconsequential.
Furthermore, although the recipients' confidence in the court might have
been impaired by a conviction of the combatant, the effect of these publica-
tions in intensifying the atmosphere out of which such a reaction would
arise seems imperceptible. 33 And finally, the epithets of the publication were
directed not at the court but rather at opponents in labor disputes, and the
defendants' only intended effect on the administration of justice was the
procuring of adequate counsel for the accused 3 4 which is particularly neces-
sary in Massachusetts in view of the absence of a public defender statute.s
26. It has been suggested that review by appellate courts would be preferable to
jury trial. See Note (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 374. But cf. In re Cheeseman, 49 N. J. L.
115, 143 (1886).
27. In several cases it has been said that intent to act contemptuously is immaterial,
since intent to do the contemptuous act is alone sufficient. But this doctrine was laid
down in cases punishing the misapplication of funds in the hands of the court where
the issue of free speech was not involved. Wartman v. Wartman, 29 Fed. Cas. No.
17,210 (C. C. D. Md. 1853) (trustee) ; Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230 (1873) (re-
ceiver).
28. Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 At. 33 (1930); State v. Circuit Court, 97
Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193 (1897). Contra: State v. Schumaker, 200 Ind. 623, 157 N. E.
769 (1927).
29. Marians v. People, 69 Colo. 87, 169 Pac. 155 (1917).
30. In re Cottingham, 66 Colo. 335, 182 Pac. 2 (1919); cf. Fx parte O'Fiel, 93
Tex. Cr. R. 214, 246 S.W. 664 (1923); Wells v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 500 (Va.
1871). But cf. In re Woolley, 11 Bush. 95 (Ky. 1875).
31. State v. American-News Co., 266 N. W. 827, 835 (S. D. 1936).
32. Little consideration, however, has been given to the mode or extent of publi-
cation. See Note (1936) 50 HARv. L. REv. 355.
33. Cf. In re Ebsworth, 17 Vict. L. R. 391 (1891).
34. The defendants' intent may not have seemed so magnanimous to the court,
since one was a leader in the activities of the Sacco-Vanzetti defense committee and
another was a special investigator for that committee.
35. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 34, § 163f. In Massachusetts
the state will provide counsel for impecunious prisoners only if accused of murder.
MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyers' Co-op., 1933) c. 277, § 55.
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While public policy clearly forbids trial outside the courts,30 it also demands
adequate provision for counsel for the accused 3 7 and freedom of discussion
of matters of public interest even if the question is before the courts.as
Consideration of the effects of this decision in hampering the activities of
defense committees and in limiting permissible comment among parties
interested in a particular controversy might well have persuaded the court
that it was inappropriate to follow unquestioningly the formula adopted in
cases involving newspaper publications" stimulated by a desire to arouse




36. See Notes (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 374, (1932) 81 U. oF P. L- REv. 214. It is
significant that relatively few newspapers that have published reports of pending judicial
controversies have been cited for contempt. See TArr, Lmw REFonru (1926) 153. This
may be due to the courts' unwillingness to antagonize influential leaders of public
opinion by a decision that might easily be said to be actuated by personal motive. See
In re Nelson, 60 P. (2d) 365, 377 (Mont. 1936).
37. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
38. See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States (1928)
28 COL L Ray. 525, 550; cf. Pound, Justice According to Law (1914) 14 CoL. L Rzy.
103, 119.
39. The cases relied on in the opinion involved newspaper publications. The punish-
ment of Felicani, seemingly the first punishment of a job printer to be approved by
American appellate courts, can be supported only by precedents dealing with newspaper
publishers who are, unlike the job printer, responsible for the words used in the
publication.
40. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402 (1918); Dale v. State,
198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781 (1926); State v. Bee Publishing Co., 60 Neb. 282, 83 N. ,V.
204 (1900).
41. State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 623, 157 N. E. 769 (1927); State v. Nelson,
29 N. D. 155, 150 N. NV. 267 (1914) ; State v. Frew, 24 V. Va. 416 (1934).
42. In re Lee, 183 AtL 560 (lid. 1936) ; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth,
188 M1ass. 449, 74 N. E. 682 (1905).
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